

Russian Government's Military Campaigns in Tashkent

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Annotation: The entry of Central Asia into Russia and its consequences has always caused and still causes an increased interest of researchers. It is no coincidence that among the great variety of problems it stands out as a special milestone that had a fateful impact on the history and life of the peoples of this region. Even at the dawn of the conquest, this process had different names, for example, “The establishment of Russian citizenship in Central Asia”, “The offensive movement of Russians in Turkestan”, “The conquest of Turkestan”, “The conquest of Central Asia”, “Our colonization in Central Asia”.

Keywords: Tashkent, military campaign, Chernyaev, war, movement.

INTRODUCTION

The sources also reflect the second campaign of M.G. Chernyaev to Tashkent, and the capture of the key fortress Niyazbek by him, and how Alimkul hastily set out from Kokand to Tashkent. In the battle of Shur-tepe, Alimkul was mortally wounded and died in May 1865. However, there is a double description regarding the place and cause of Alimkul's death. For example, in "Birzhevye Vedomosti" the place of death of Alimkul is Sarytyube, and in the Kokand chronicles - Shurtepe. Moreover, in this battle, Alimkul was not killed, and the cause of death is not a battlefield. As noted in the chronicles: “When Alimkul was wounded and the battle was interrupted, some of his associates, considering the moment favorable, left Alimkul and hastily left for Kokand. This news completely struck him, and he died”.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

So that our judgments are not unipolar, let us turn to other sources, for example, in the Kokand chronicles - "Ta'rih-i amir-i lashkar" a completely different picture is drawn, which reports on negotiations with M.G. Chernyaev at the beginning of 1865 on about the conclusion of peace and the establishment of a new Kokand-Russian border. In essence, Alimkul (the years of his reign of the Kokand Khanate - July 1863 - May 1865) evaded a proposal for peace and the establishment of a new border between Shymkent and Tashkent, which was quite advantageous for Kokand. Realizing the futility of further military actions, Alimkul in his heart agreed with the idea of M.G. Chernyaev.

The logic of this fact lies in the fact that the military-political situation in 1865 was complex and difficult, and only the military skill and efforts of General M.G. Chernyaev ensured the victorious march of the Russian troops inland. The author points out that the "laurels of victory" acquired by M.G. Chernyaev were easily accepted by D.I. Romanovsky.

It goes without saying, “when domination is “finally” established in the conquered territory, that is, the so-called from the first Russian outposts to Tashkent, then the conqueror can only enjoy the fruits of victory”. However, at this time there is a change of leadership.

This situation (the events of 1865 - I.M.) the author of the article in "Russian Invalid" sets out differently, that is, objecting to his opponent, he argues as follows: "In 1865, in the form of keeping the emir from hostile actions against us, it was deemed necessary to completely stop trade with Bukhara - a measure for our trade is hardly particularly beneficial. He must remember that, despite the presence of Russian power in Tashkent, the emir managed to occupy Khojent, Kokan, defeated the Kipchaks, thus entrusting the increase in his possessions that he had begun to more than double, and ended up with delaying our sent to him ambassadors who returned only in the middle of 1866, after our military successes".

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Military scenario 1865 - 1866 led to the occupation of Tashkent, Nova, Khujand, Ura-Tyube and Jizzakh, which expanded the geography of colonial possession in Central Asia.

It is important to note that when comparing the description of historical events with local sources, you can see a completely different picture. For example, in the chronicle - "Ta'rih-i Jadida-yi Toshkand" the author notes that in 1865 there was some (either classified as "secret" or unofficial - I.M.) agreement between the emir and the Russians on the division of Turkestan and Maverannah between them, on the basis of which the emir received freedom of action in Ferghana, and the Russians in Dasht-i Kipchak and Tashkent. However, after the capture of Tashkent, Russian-Bukhara relations became more complicated. Using the situation, in February 1866, M.G. Chernyaev made a reconnaissance of Jizzakh. Russian-Bukhara relations became even more aggravated after the recall of M.G. Chernyaev to St. Petersburg and the arrival of D.I. Romanovsky in his place in Tashkent (April 1866) (10.96).

Outlining the historical picture on the basis of the above arguments, referring to the author's article in *Birzhevye Vedomosti*, it is impossible not to notice that the arguments presented were taken from the latest news received from Central Asia. For example, "The adventure of Khludov's clerks in Kokan, the attack on the Cossack detachments and the parties of our gold miners within our own borders (property - conquest or annexation, - I.M.), a military walk between our forts on the Syr batyr Syzdyk with 2000 robbers. And, finally, the recent report by "Russian Invalid" dated June 20 that six companies of the Jizzakh detachment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A.K. having scattered the crowd, they returned to Yany-Kurgan. All these undeniable facts taken together, don't they prove that our affairs in Central Asia at the present moment are going, if not worse, then not better than before? We are far from being able to find any analogy between our wars in Central Asia and the Mexican expedition of the French; nevertheless, the general law that military operations in distant countries are costly and fraught with the greatest dangers applies to us as to another nation on us, even more so than on others, since we cannot boast of the prosperity of our finances. Without touching at all on the delicate question of whether we should have climbed so far into the depths of Central Asia, we will confine ourselves to recognizing the accomplished fact that by occupying Tashkent we turned against ourselves not only Kokan, but also Khiva and fanatical Bukhara and even Samarkand ... Fatherland without victories on the field battle highly appreciates the merits of his sons, who so honestly fulfill their duty in a semi-savage country inhabited by fanatical and hostile peoples, and if the role of guardian of the peaceful interests of the fatherland is less brilliant than the role of the winner of his armed enemies, then it is, in any case, no less glorious and worthy of a reward ... In a word, our troops, even without battles, open up a vast field for distinction in Central Asia, the blood of a Russian soldier is too expensive, and it should not be shed unless absolutely necessary in the Asian steppe"(3.6).

Major General D.I. Romanovsky, who replaced M.G. Chernyaev in the Turkestan region in April 1866, noted that "difficult" implementation of the highest approved decision not to move the state border beyond the line Julek - Turkestan - Shymkent - Aulie-Ata. But the main thing from that moment - "all desires to become friendly with the Central Asian rulers" were not successful, and moreover, the former, "for a long time friend of Russia" Emir of Bukhara, became her enemy".

CONCLUSION

Summing up the arguments of the above controversy, we can say the following: while satisfying Russian interests, at the same time it was necessary to do good to the local population (Turkestanis - I.M.), if their interests collided with Russians, then the administration was obliged to sacrifice the interests of the local population, of course, in favor of the Russian invaders. Since they were promised that with the occupation of the Tashkent region, the state treasury would get rid of the costs of local government and military operations to occupy this region. However, this could only be achieved by increasing taxes, ending hostilities, or developing local trade. Unfortunately, this was in the future, and in 1865 - 1866. the Russians were forced to fight. Therefore, the situation was indeed "extremely difficult."

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