

Credible Electoral System, the Recipe for Good Governance: A Study of INEC (1999-2011)

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Abstract

This study is titled credible electoral process, the recipe for good governance in Nigeria: a study of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (1999- 2011). The broad objective is to ascertain the relationship between a credible electoral process and hope for good governance in Nigeria. It further uncovered the constraints and electoral behaviour that bedevil INEC, and determining factors that could engender an objective electoral process in Nigeria. The study utilized secondary data and content analysis methods but adopted the structural-functionalist theory. Findings revealed that some legal framework constraints of sections 153(1), 154(1) and 156 of the 1999 constitution and sections 5-5 of 2010 Electoral Act and other electoral behavioural factors which include political thuggery and more, weaken the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The implications of these findings show impending doom for governance and nascent democracy. Based on the findings, the study recommended among other things the strengthening of INEC's enabling laws, structure and funding arrangement through constitutional amendment provisions inter alia.

Keywords: Election, Good Governance, INEC

I. Introduction

The election represents a modern and universally accepted process through which individuals are openly and methodically chosen to represent a body or community or entity of government, which is one of the cardinal features of democracy. This implies that without elections, democracy can neither be practised nor institutionalized. It is because of the importance of elections in the democratic process that any problem associated with the electoral process may have a direct impact on democratic institutions and governance.

Nigeria is a nation endowed with abundant natural resources and wealth from crude oil exports, which constitute about 90 per cent of revenue (Ezekwesili, 2012). In spite of resources abundance, the nation keeps lagging behind others in all areas of development (Ogundiya, 2010). These problems manifest as political instability, abject poverty, acute unemployment at 23.9 per cent, electoral violence, high crime wave, high infant mortality rate and decreasing life expectancy among others. The prevailing situation shows that good governance has become an illusion in Nigeria. According to the African Development Bank (AFDB, 1999), good governance is a process referring to ways in which power is exercised in the management of a nation, with respect to accountability, transparency, combating corruption, participation and legal judicial reforms. It further identified the elements of rule of law, responsiveness, consensus, orientation, equity, effectiveness, efficiency and strategic vision (UNDP, 1997).

Weak institutional and legislative arrangement has presented loopholes upon which individuals and political office holders execute corrupt practices and further weaken bureaucratic institutions like Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Nigeria. Gunnar Myrdal calls it 'folklore of corruption' (Amuwo, 2005). It undermines the electoral process through the rigging, political violence and electoral manipulations. The situations of electoral problems in Nigeria seem historical. The advent of the Clifford constitution of 1922 introduced the elective principle for

Lagos and Calabar, as the basis for political representation in the colonial political structure (Seteolu, 2005). Several reviews of the electoral process under the 1946, 1951 and 1954 constitutions further expanded the political space and encouraged political participation. The 1959 election set the stage in the context of ethno-regional parties.

The trajectory of electoral authorities started with post-independent Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) headed by its first chairman. Sir Kofu Abayomi and later replaced by Mr Eyo Esua (Aderemi, 2005). However, that commission was sacked by the 1966 military coup. It lasted until 1976 when General Obasanjo established the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) headed by Chief Michael Ani and promulgated by Decree 41 of 1979 (Jinadu, 1981). The contentious issue of two-third of nineteen states compromised and scandalized Chief Ani out of FEDECO and was replaced by Justice Ovie-Whisky. Also, the allegiance to the Federal Government and the fraud of the 1983 election scandalized the commission which was replaced by the National Electoral Commission, NEC by Decree 23 of 1987 and headed by Prof. Erne Awa. The aftermath of the attempted ban on erstwhile politicians and the local government election of 1987, on zero party bases, saw his removal and replacement with Prof. Humphrey Nwosu. Nwosu's NEC registered 13 political parties in 1990 but Babangida's Administration cancelled it and imposed two parties: the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) on Nigerians.

Prof. Nwosu conducted the June 12 election and released the result in 14 out of 30 states, against the wish of the military government, which stopped him by force. However, it dashed the hope of Chief MKO Abiola of SDP who was poised to win. Nwosu was replaced with Prof Okon Uya whose tenure was visited by the displeasure of Nigerians accusing Babangida of appropriating Abiola's mandate. He later handed over to Ernest Shonekon's interim government which was sacked by General Sani Abacha in 1993, who dissolved NEC and replaced it with the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) under Chief Dagogo-Jack. He was equally under the manipulation of government before the sudden death of Abacha in June 1998. General Abdusalami Abubakar dissolved all his political structures and reconstituted the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) under the headship of respected Justice Ephraim Akpata, to pacify Nigerians. Akpata lived up to expectations but was succeeded by Dr Abel Gwobedia upon death in 2000. Gwobedia was again manipulated by The Peoples Democratic Party, PDP government in the 2003 election before he handed over to Prof Maurice Iwu, who turned out worst in the 2007 election and was replaced with the incumbent, Prof Atahiru Jega. It is clear from the foregoing that there have been fundamental structural and institutional constraints that subject electoral management bodies to government manipulations and subsequently marred the history of electoral administration in Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

The gloomy picture of electoral administration in Nigeria portrays a negative impression about the electoral management body (EMB), which is bestowed on Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Therefore, something is fundamentally wrong with the Independent National Electoral Commission, which saddles the electoral ship of state. The near hopeless state of ejection situation in Nigeria has implications for governance and influences it negatively to permit the emergence of wrong leaders through irregularities. This is as a result of constraints that bedevil the Independent National Electoral Commission in the performance of its functions. The situation is such that certain enabling legislative items in the 1999 constitution and the 2010 Electoral Act which suppose to empower the Commission are not objective instruments in reality. Sections 153(1), 154(1), 156(1) and sections 3-5 of the Electoral Act 2010 all subjugate the commission to the whims of the Presidency and more. Other factors include the unwholesome attitude of the

security agencies, particularly the police who are influenced by the ruling party to intimidate the opposition.

The negative mindset of politicians features political thuggery, assassination, ballot box snatching, voters intimidation, intra-and inter-party clashes and communal unrest (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart, 2010). Cases of compromise on the part of INEC officials and the logistic challenges constitute a setback to the commission's activities. To make matters worse, the high rate of illiteracy among the citizenry put at 46% of the total population (FRN/NBS, 2006) undermine the participatory ability of the electorate in the electoral process. This is crucial because elections determine the methods and manner through which changes in the socio-political order occur. Where this method fails, individuals and groups may be left to choose their means, including assassination, coup d'états, revolution, insurgency and guerilla warfare, to press their claim to power (Ejue and Ekanem, 2011). This fact makes the issue of the election so sensitive in Nigeria 2015 and beyond.

Objectives of the Study

Accordingly, this study would be guided by the following objectives;

1. To ascertain the relationship between credible electoral process and the hope for good governance in Nigeria.
2. To find out the institutional constraints and electoral behaviour which bedevil INEC in the conduct of the election.
3. To determine factors that could engender an objective electoral process in Nigeria.

II. Literature Review

Election

The election represents a modern and universally accepted process through which individuals are openly and methodically chosen to represent a body or community or entity of government, which is one of the cardinal features of democracy. This implies that without elections, democracy can neither be practised nor institutionalized. It is because of the importance of elections in the democratic process that any problem associated with the electoral process may have a direct impact on democratic institutions and governance.

Elections are a vital and integral component of democracy. It is a process in which eligible voters, in a congenial atmosphere, exercise their franchise by electing those who would govern them for a specific period. It is a time-honoured process through which leaders emerge in a democratic polity. According to Saine (2011, p.241), elections are fundamental to any political system based on principles of democracy and the republican form of government under democracy, in which elections in which all eligible voters may participate are the ultimate source of government authority.

The quality of leadership and its capacity to adhere to the yearnings of the people is dependent on the level of popular participation. This is predicated on the fact that a less intimidating and horror-free electoral process is a prelude to development (Akani, 2018). He further asserted that no political system can claim any semblance of democratic ethics when its electoral process is characterised by intimidation and structured to favour a parochial class. This is why Nanyande (1989, p.77) noted that the key to mass participation in democracy is an election. Elections represent a way of making a choice that is open to all. Some of its main features include:

- i. An electoral rule that will guard the process
- ii. A competition between two or more people representing themselves or their political parties,
- iii. a peaceful environment in which voters can freely exercise their democratic rights
- iv. franchise.
- v. An electoral umpire with the sole responsibility of supervising, organizing, and announcing the results of the elections.
- vi. An opportunity to redress cases of injustice and breaches of the electoral rules (Akani, 2018).

These five conditions must be preceded before a free and smooth electoral process can take place; otherwise, it becomes a "fallacy of electoralism." It is through this process that the Lincolnian notion of democracy is practicalized. Representatives are elected by the people to protect their lives and property and ensure the efflorescence of their well-being. This is why Appadorai (2004, p.529) noted that it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. According to Bassey (2011, p.168),

The election is one of the visible means through which the people express their consent, commitment, and mobilise support for the government in power. In the era of representative government, the election is a powerful means of ensuring continuity of democratic governance. It is a means of choosing among political antecedents for a given political office or groups of offices.

People have the opportunity to scrutinise the competence of the candidates vying for positions through their political campaigns and manifestos. In this process, the people become the "bride" to be bought by the best candidate. It is this scenario that prompted Kich Jr. to describe the election as the marketplace of democracy (Akani, 2018). It may also not be out of place to consider the election as the "duo ex machina" for fostering competitive party politics and measuring the performance of leaders.

Good Governance

Recently the terms "governance" and "good governance" are being increasingly used in development literature. Bad governance is being increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within our societies (UNESCAP, 2018). Major donors and international financial institutions are increasingly basing their aid and loans on the condition that reforms that ensure "good governance" are undertaken.

The concept of "governance" is not new. It is as old as human civilization. Simply put "governance" means the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). Governance can be used in several contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, national governance and local governance. Since governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented, an analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved in decision-making and implementing the decisions made and the formal and informal structures that have been set in place to arrive at and implement the decision. Government is one of the actors in governance. Other actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of government that is under discussion. In rural areas, for example, other actors may include influential landlords, associations of peasant farmers, cooperatives, NGOs, research institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions political

parties, the military etc. In the context of a political and institutional environment that upholds human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, good governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for equitable and sustainable development (Austrian Development Commission, 2011).

Good governance is predicated upon mutually supportive and cooperative relationships between government, civil society, and the private sector. The nature of relationships among these three groups of actors, and the need to strengthen viable mechanisms to facilitate interactions, assume critical importance. Second, good governance is defined as possession of all, or some combination of, the following elements: participation, transparency of decision-making, accountability, rule of law, predictability. Third, good governance is normative in conception. The values that provide the underpinning for governance are the values postulated by the defining actors and institutions (Simonis, 2004).

Good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law (UNESCAP, 2018; Austrian Development Commission, 2011). It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society. Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force (UNESCAP, 2018).

Structural dependence of INEC and the administration of election in Nigeria

There are two crucial areas in the structure of INEC which compromises its independence with implications for the electoral administrative process and the stability of democracy in Nigeria. These include the method of constituting the electoral management team (EMT) (ie commissioners) and the funding of INEC, 2012). Out of the two methods of determining the profile of members of the electoral commission, the first option involves appointing only members who are not partisan or politically inclined; while the second option involves the appointment on the basis of their political affiliation. In essence, the neutrality expected of the electoral commission may take two forms:

- i. Either a deliberate consideration of the political dimension with the risk of partiality which is expected to be averted through a balanced representation of political forces, or
- ii. An exclusion in the principle of any political consideration, which is manifested not only in the exclusion of political parties in the selection of the member of the commission but also in the demand for non-partisan affiliation of members to be appointed into the commission (Hounkpe and fall, 2011;11). This has supposedly, been the case in the constitution of the members of INEC.

In the appointment of electoral commissioners, section 154(i) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria empowers the president to appoint the chairman and commissioners of INEC subject to confirmation by the senate (FRN, 1999). Although the provision was not operational in 1999 election the provision as gathered from interview with political party officials and Transition Monitoring Group (TMG- a coalition of civil society organization human right group evolved in election observation in Nigeria) States that former President pbasanjo appointed members of his political parry-the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) as commissioners, who served in the electoral commission during the conduct of 2003, 2007 and even 2011 presidential elections. TMG also maintain that most of the national commissioner and particularly, the Resident Electoral

Commissioner's (RECS) were nominated by PDP Governors from respective States. This problem is compounded by section 156(i) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria which states that no person shall be qualified to be a member of INEC if he is not qualified or if he is disqualified for election as a member of the house of representative. While INEC is presented and labelled as an "independent body, it has in reality been an extension of the executive.

Nigeria's 1999 transition to civilian government culminated along a turbulent period of military rule and failed democratic experiments. At the time of the political handover, many Nigerians expressed hope for a democratic dividend that would expand political liberties, improve the performance of government, encourage accountability among leaders, and revive the ailing economy. After initial euphoria in the wake of the Abacha dictatorship a great sense of realism set in among much of the public (Lewis et al, 2002). The anticipated benefits of democracy have been slow to emerge, and the new dispensation has failed to fulfil, the expectations of many Nigerians, Analysts, Commentators and average citizens expressed deep concerns about political violence, electoral malpractice, corruption, ineffective government, unresponsive leaders and economic deprivation.

III. Empirical Review

Bratton and Lewis (2005) in their study on Nigeria, conducted in 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005 provided a unique profile of changing Nigeria attitudes since the inauguration of the new civilian regime in 1999. With the aid of statistical presentation method Nigeria citizen's evaluated political performance in different ways ranging from effectiveness of leaders, to the output of governance, and the quality of institutions was revealed. When trying to understand the range of public opinion, distinction was made between government of the day (policy makers) and democratic institution. As seen below, while Nigerians are generally discouraged with political performance, they are not equally discouraged with all dimensions of the system.

Regarding important output of the government, illustrations below shows the declining evaluation of the public towards their elected leaders. In the performance of elected officials the most noteworthy trend is the downward convergence of all these evaluations, in the early years after the transition, majority of Nigerians expressed general approval of the performances of elected officials, with President Obasanjo receiving the highest approval (72% in year 2001) followed by approval for local government officials (67%) and National. Assembly representatives (58%). By 2003, these evaluations emerge at much lower levels. In the most recent poll(2005) president Obasanjo's approval rating was 32% (a drop of 40% points from 2001) followed by approval for local government (28%) and legislative representatives (23%).

On the issue of changing public assessment of government policy performance, the list covers a selection of core economic, social and political concerns. Nigerians are increasingly downbeat about government efforts to manage the economy (with 57% in yr. 2000 down to 20% in 2005), encourage equity (39% in 2000 down to 10% in 2005), provide education (60% in 2000 down to 38% in 2005) and limit crime (60% in 2000 to 35% in 2005). The public has responded rely to recent anti-corruption initiative, although little more than a third of Nigerians approved die government performances in the most recent survey. With regards to HIV/AIDS, the public expresses relatively consistent if modest approval. Nigeria evidently shows diminishing confidence in the government's ability to handle crucial issue affecting then lives.

Considering the matter of public trust in important institution of democracy, Bratton and Lewis (2005) further shows that popular trust in major institutions has subsided, but not nearly steeply as assessments of government performance. Trust in the National Assembly, the Independent

National Electoral commission (INEC) and the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) has receded since the first civilian term, but the decline has been comparatively modest (on the order of 12-16 % points).

However, trust in these institutions has remained firm, since 2003. It also noted the high degree of trust (67%) for the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) which has spearheaded government anti-corruption effort, whether viewed as part of the government or the regime, the high public trust for this major institution of public accountability is significant, particularly when matched with growing approval for anti- corruption efforts.

In one important area, however, there is a substantial deficit of public trust. As seen below, Nigerians expressed minimal trust in elections, one of the core institutions of democracy. This is a further reflection of the negative popular reactions to the controversial 2003 election. Assessments of the relatively 'honesty' of the preceding election dropped from 76% among Nigerians in 2000, to just 44% in 2003. Currently, about two - thirds (67%) of the public believes that election are not effective mechanisms for selecting leaders. There is considerable skepticism towards some important democratic structures. However the following recommendations were made to ameliorate the situation: Political office holders should embrace equity and transparency in the execution of their official functions, there should be sensitization of the citizenry towards popular democratic participation as a way to improve the quality of governance, Civic education and enlightenment program of activities should be encouraged by government and civil society groups and respect for the Rule of law should be the hallmark of constituted authority and governance.

In another study, Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart(2010) utilized a sample survey method to arrive at the result of their special report on the 2011 election in Nigeria. Their finding summarized that 2011 polls will mark the fourth multiparty election in Nigeria and the second hand over of civilian administration since the country's return to democracy in 1999. Past election cycles have featured political assassinations, voter intimidation, intra- and interparty clashes, and communal unrest. Party primary season, the days immediately surrounding the election and the announcement of results have been among the most violent periods in previous cycles. Although the recent 2007 elections derived from benefits from local conflict management capacity, they were roundly criticized for being neither free nor fair. That 2011 election would mark a turning point in the consolidation of Nigeria's democracy but could provoke worsening ethnocentric clashes and contribute to the continuing scourge of zero- politics. That president Umar Yar 'Adua, who died in May 2010, kept his 2007 inauguration promise, to create an Electoral Reform Committee(ERC) but failed to adopt key recommendations of the committee made. Furthermore, President Goodluck Jonathan, who succeeded him, appointed respected Professor Attahiru Jega, to head the Independent Electoral Commission, INEC, inspiring hope that the electoral process would improve in 2011. The issue of 'zoning', the political *elite* power-sharing agreement, has taken centre stage in the current election cycle and will drive significant conflict if the debate around it devolves into outright hostilities. However, the following recommendations were made by the study. Local and international organizations and Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) must redouble effort both to prevent and resolve conflict and to promote conflict sensitivity; the near' term requires an increasingly important role for the judiciary in combating electoral fraud, while the longer term requires the creation of the recommended Electoral Offences Commission, which would specialize in the investigation and prosecution of crimes; local agencies and respected community leaders should remain proactive in violence prevention programming and high voter turnout and citizen monitoring is vital for ensuring that elections in Nigeria are credible and civil.

IV. Theoretical Framework

The structural-functionalist theory' is suitably adopted for this study. According to Macionis (2010) one of the proponents, the theory view society as complex social structures which work together to promote solidarity and stability. Its focus is on the importance of social structures, which inform patterns of social behaviour, with consequences on the operation of society as a whole. It categorizes the outcome of social structure interaction into three as manifestations, latent function and Dysfunction.

Adopting the approach to this study, the researcher recognized that the independent National Electoral Commission is a relevant institution of electoral administration in Nigeria, operating on the capacity of a social structure to determine the outcome of election and governance, hi this respect, the activity of this body has manifested dysfunctional outcomes, in the form of rigging, political violence and electoral mismanagement which has caused leadership problem and bad governance in Nigeria. Therefore, such manifestation of social structure disequilibrium in INEC activities calls for consensus by way of restructuring or review of the legal framework arrangement that weaken the institution. This would restore efficiency and credibility in electoral management process.

V. Procedures for Achieving Stated Objectives

It is noteworthy to mention that this study relied on a secondary source of data. To that extent, it made the reliable conclusion in line with the demands of the objectives as follows:

Objective 1: To ascertain the relationship between credible electoral process and hope for good governance in Nigeria.

The content analysis presentation aided the achievement of this objective following the historical record and experience of Electoral Management Body in Nigeria. According Seteolu (2005; 34) the 1959 general election was marked by irregularities and violence. The contentious issue of two third of nineteen states in 1979 election compromised Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) and scandalized Chief Ani out of office (Jinadu.1981); and the worst outing of Maurice Iwu's INEC, were all responsible for the failure of Fust, Second, and Third Republics that left Nigeria's economy worst than they met it, with high level of unemployment, abject poverty and insecurity among others! Ogundiya, 2010). More so, findings revealed that election dose not enable voters to remove political leaders in Nigeria by 67% against 27% respondents who said otherwise (Bratton and Lewis, 2005). Therefore, the researcher is led to conclude that by implication of conduct and outcome, the electoral process has relationship with governance.

Objective 2: To find out the institutional constraints and electoral behavior that be devil INEC in the conduct of elections.

The benefit of logical deduction through content analysis shows that the legal framework stipulation of the 1999 constitution, compromise the issue of institutional autonomy of INEC in the conduct of elections in the following ways:

- a) The reference of INEC in the constitution as a Federal executive body by section 153 (1) of the 1999 constitution subordinates the organ to the whims and caprices of the president.
- b) The mode of appointment of INEC's Chairman, commissioners, the Resident Electoral Commissioners (REC) and commission secretary (See section 154 (1) of the 1999 constitution) by the president is indeed an aberration to a body expected to play a neutral and impartial role in the conduct of elections.

- c) The method of qualification for appointment as an INEC official with membership of a political party (see section 156 of the 1999 constitution) is against popular practices among civilized democratic nations.
- d) Most significantly, the funding of INEC as stipulated in section 3-5 of the Electoral Act 2010 is a major set back. This situation exposes the commission to political manipulation and delay at the ministry of finance. This implication hampers electoral administration and engenders credibility problem. Other factors includes;
- e) Unwholesome attitude of security agencies who are often used by the ruling party to intimidate the opposition.
- f) The negative mindset of politicians which results to political assassination, tuggery and ballot box snatching.
- g) The compromise of some INEC official as well as logistics setback during election.

Objective 3: To determine factors that could engender objective electoral process in Nigeria.

Equally, through content analysis method objective measures should expunge sections 153 (1), 154 (1) 156 of 1999 constitution and sections 3-5 of me electoral Act 2010 and replaced with items that would compare with international standards as follows:

- a) Remove the power of appointing INEC Chairman, Commissioners, Resident Electoral Commissioners and secretary from the president and his executive council and subjected to public nomination and voting ,
- b) Place INEC as an independent body by removing it from the Federal executive body.
- c) IN EC's funding should entirely be placed under the priority of consolidated fund appropriation as obtainable in Ghana, whose electoral body is acclaimed to be credible. (Ibrahim and Garaba. 2010)
- d) Staggered election practice among various states of the federation should be adopted. The experience of Anambra and Edo states elections of 2006 and 2007 respectively, was an acid test to litmus, in electoral transparency

VI Conclusion and Recommendations

This study utilized secondary data to address the stated objectives and succeeded in establishing a relationship between legal framework arrangement, institutional weakness, election mismanagement and leadership problem of governance in Nigeria. Reinstating the expectations of the study findings arrived that there exist a relationship, by conduct and outcome, between electoral process and governance. It uphold that the historical propagation of electoral irregularities by the Electoral Management Organs (EMOs), represented by INEC in Nigeria, be quit bad leadership which has negative implication to governance. This situation is capable of under developing the nation, unless the trend is reversed.

The findings of the second objective which addressed the institutional constraints and electoral behaviour that bedevil INEC in the conduct of election, held that the legal frame work items of sections 153(1 k 154(1), 156 of 1999 constitution and section 3-5 of the Electoral Act 2010 subordinate INEC under the president. The mode of appointment of INEC chairman, commissioners and Resident Electoral Commissioners (REC) by the president, the method of qualification for appointment as INEC official with membership of a political party and lastly the method of funding through the finance ministry, all connive to weaken the institution and prevent it

from functioning effectively. This situation has the implication of fostering the emergence of unpopular leadership, who would not account to or depend on the electorates for reaction. Also, the corroboration of biased security agencies, compromise of me corrupt INEC official and the activities of ruthless politicians all contribute to worsen die situation in one way or the other.

Thirdly, some factors that could engender objective electoral process in Nigeria were itemized. They include removal of contradictory sections 153(1), 154(1), 156 of 1999 constitution and sections 3-5 of the electoral Act 2010 and replaced with global standard practice of public nomination and voting to elect INEC chairman and commissioners, other than presidential appointment; removing INEC from the subjections of Federal Executive Council, placing her funding under the consolidated revenue appropriation as obtainable in Ghana's acclaimed credible electoral body among others. These measures are capable of positive transformation of the prevailing situation to guarantee good governance practice.

In view of the findings and to further consolidate the achievements of 2011 election, the following recommendations should be adopted by the government and stakeholders like INEC and others.

1. The 1999 constitution should be amended to strengthen INEC's legal framework, so that the chairmen, commissioners, Resident electoral commissioners and secretary should be nominated through an independent process of voting, other than Presidential appointment. This will give merit to the positions.
2. Independent candidates should be allowed to run for political office in line with the principles of democracy.
3. Any amendment on electoral legislation should be done on time to allow parties, candidates and voter's adequate time to prepare themselves for elections as with rules and regulations.
4. To improve transparency, the electoral act should ensure official results are released at the polling units, wards, constituencies and collection centres.
5. Section 3-5 of the 2010 electoral act which exposed INEC to delay and manipulation at the ministry of finance should be expunged. Funding the commission should be entirely direct from consolidated fund appropriation, as applicable to Ghana's commendable electoral body.
6. Restriction of vehicular movement, except essential duty services, during the election, is a good security measure that guides against ballot box snatching.
7. Alternative Dispute resolution (ADR) provision should be made by the Electoral Act to complement the Judicial Electoral Tribunals and address the numerous cases of electoral litigations. ADR should equally be extended to the political party's internal dispute resolution.
8. Civic education programmes should be strengthened by INEC and Non-Governmental Organizations to enhance the capacity and responsiveness of the electorates.
9. Media Monitoring System (MMS), which meets international standard practice, is needed for cohesive system feedback and control.
10. The security agencies need more training to bring down conflict without brutality.
11. The place of an independent judiciary' in electoral dispute resolution is indispensable. The National Judicial Commission should not relent in efforts to sanitize the bar and practice.

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