

**United Nations Security Council and the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security: A Study of Syrian Civil War,
2011-2022****HART, Akie Opuene, PhD**

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Annotation: This study investigated ‘the United Nations Security Council's primary mandate of maintenance of global peace and security and its role on Human Rights Protection in the Syrian Crisis (2011-2017)’. It was opined that the outbreak of such massive human rights abuses in Syria has led to a change in the way the UN conventionally deals with flagrant human rights violations as well as with humanitarian crises. For the first time, the Council began to use the "threat to international peace and security" clause from Chapter VII of the UN Charter to justify the multi-lateral use of force in internal armed conflicts for humanitarian reasons. The study adopted the theory of Neo-classical Realism. The study was primarily based on secondary sources of data collection and analysis. It was discovered that the idea of R2P was informed by the compelling need to prevent a repeat of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, and how the UN and the International Community looked the other way while over 800,000 people, including women and children were massacred within 100 days. However, due to the mutual distrust among the Permanent Members and taking into consideration of the Libyan experiences, that was counter-productive, the UNSC could not take a decisive steps through the deployment of military arsenals in curbing the menace of genocide and ethnic cleansings in Syria and build a coalition for the resettlement of refugees, starting with an increase in its own intake. Admitting 65,000 of the most vulnerable Syrian refugees would allow the United States to lead by example and would establish a foundation on which to re-build global commitments to burden-sharing.

Keywords: Human Rights, Civil War, Humanitarian Crises, Genocides, Ethnic-Cleansings, Peace, Security.

I. INTRODUCTION

Many states, like Syria, rely on financial help and military protection from either the former Soviet Union (USSR) or the United States (USA), depending on the prevailing realities on the ground in the interaction of endogenous and exogenous factors. However, due to the superpower rivalry between these institutions, the United Nations (UN) was unable to take direct action on matters relating to severe human rights violations in those nations. In light of this, there was no precedent for the UN to sanction violent action across national lines without prior sovereign approval, owing to the UN Charter's protection of each nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity in Article 24.

Baker (2014) observes that as the superpowers removed their pressure and controlling interest in many regions of the world after the conclusion of the Cold War, a massive breakout of ethnic conflicts and humanitarian catastrophes started to develop. Human rights violations have increased in nations such as Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Cambodia. The emergence of such enormous human rights breaches has resulted in a shift in the way the UN traditionally responds with gross human rights violations as well as humanitarian emergencies. For the first time, the Council used Chapter VII of the UN Charter's "threat to international peace and security" provision to authorise multilateral use of force in internal armed conflicts for humanitarian grounds.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) theory is essentially a preventative doctrine, and it was not until 2011 in Libya that the Security Council officially mentioned R2P while implementing coercive military measures against a sovereign state that was slaughtering its own people (Brighi, 2013). The ultimate collapse of the government of Muammar Qaddafi by troops who were assigned to perform a civilian protection operation prompted a strong discussion at the UN concerning the link between duty to protect and "regime change. The Syrian crisis erupted in March 2011, while the situation in neighbouring Libya was swiftly devolving into civil conflict. As the Syrian situation escalated in the summer of 2011, and discussion over the continuing military action in Libya heated up, several Security Council members were sceptical of demands that the Council impose an arms embargo and targeted penalties on the Syrian government (Gifkins 2012). For example, non-permanent Council members India, Brazil and South Africa (collectively known as the "IBSA group") appeared to broadly accept the argument that "external interference" would push Syria towards a sectarian civil war. Nevertheless, it was under India's Security Council Presidency during August that the body was able to produce its first formal statement on the conflict. Requiring consensus for adoption, the Presidential Statement condemned;

Wide spread violations of human rights and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities." Calling for "an immediate end to all violence," the statement urged "all sides" to refrain from "reprisals, including attacks against state institutions (Crisis Group, 2011, p.12).

The statement underlined the Security Council's "support to Syria's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity," while acknowledging "the proclaimed pledges by the Syrian government to change." Far from the Security Council chamber in New York, a high-level team from the three IBSA nations visited Damascus in August and met with President Assad and Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moualem. According to News Reports (2018), IBSA officials raised worries about the violence, and Assad responded by admitting that some errors had been made by the security forces in the early phases of the turmoil and that steps were ongoing to avoid their repetition. Erskine (2012). (2012). According to Erskine (2012), Syria's Foreign Minister, Salam Moualem, "reiterated that Syria would be a free, pluralistic, and multi-party democracy by the end of the year." It was unclear if the IBSA states were really comforted, but all three countries later abstained on an October 2011 draught Security Council resolution aimed at holding the Assad administration responsible for crimes that had already killed over 2,000 people. South Africa's refusal to vote for the resolution was explained by Ambassador Baso Sangqu, who said that in the case of the Syrian crisis, "the templates for the solution were quite apparent; it was along the lines of Libya." The assumption that the nine nations who voted in favour of the draught Syria resolution were merely laying the groundwork for a NATO-led military action in Syria was, at best, erroneous. However, the three developing countries' abstentions revealed a troubling lack of agreement within the Security Council on how to react effectively to fatal domestic conflicts in the wake of the Arab Spring and the Libya operation.

In the midst of atrocities, the Security Council was divided between a majority that wanted a vigorous response in accordance with R2P and a veto-wielding minority that did not, while the influential IBSA member states appeared to be abstaining, both literally and metaphorically, from the process of finding a solution (Campbell, 2014, p.21).

However, by February 2012, when Russia and China vetoed a second draught resolution, the Security Council's other thirteen members (including India and South Africa) were firmly in favour of international diplomacy and multilateral sanctions aimed at putting an end to horrific atrocities in Syria. The Arab League, the European Union (EU), Turkey, and a number of other governments openly condemned the Syrian government's acts and diplomatically isolated the regime. One year after the crisis started, in March 2012, at least 49 nations had implemented bilateral targeted sanctions, and at least 14 had shuttered their embassies in Damascus (Downes, 2010).

Other sections of the UN system, as stressed by (Kuus, 2015), also lived up to their obligations. Between 2011 and September 2014, the Human Rights Council in Geneva enacted thirteen resolutions denouncing mass crimes in Syria and establishing an impartial Commission of Inquiry to record severe breaches of human rights. Similarly, the General Assembly voted seven resolutions denouncing Syrian crimes, with 137 nations in the 193-member assembly supporting a February 2012 resolution. Despite a fluctuating number of abstentions, no more than 13 nations voted against any General Assembly resolution denouncing crimes in Syria. Furthermore, according to Kuus (2015), the Secretary-General and his Special Advisors for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect issued a number of comments denouncing mass crimes in Syria and advocating for civilian protection. As a result, Ralph (2016) stated that Russia abstained on Resolution 2117 concerning small arms and light weapons. However, between 2005 and January 2015, China voted for 28 R2P resolutions, while Russia voted for 27, including two on Syria (Ralph, 2016). In other words, Russia and China were not as adamantly opposed to mass atrocity prevention and the duty to protect as is commonly imagined. We will never know what would have happened if the Security Council had sent a clear message to both the Syrian government and armed rebels in October 2011 or February 2012 that the international community was united in its opposition to further mass atrocity crimes and was prepared to use carefully applied non-military coercive measures to stop them. What we do know is that the lack of accountability fostered increasingly severe kinds of lethal violence at each stage of the war (Mohammad, 2002). In this light, arguably the most egregious diplomatic failure during the first year and a half of the Syrian crisis was the Security Council's reluctance to support former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's efforts to broker a truce and negotiate an end to the conflict. The primary reason for the lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the UN Security Council was the consequence of a similar intervention in Libya that had a concealed purpose of regime change that caused more issues than it addressed. The current degree of insecurity, as well as the spiral effects on neighbouring and distant nations, as a consequence of the expansion of light and heavy weapons. This is in addition to militia and mercenary disrupting other countries' security.

Statement of the problem

Human rights abuses have been widespread and significant throughout the Syrian civil war, with UN assessments claiming that the conflict has been "marked by a total lack of regard to the rules of international law by the warring parties, who have 'inflicted civilians enormous suffering'" (Gallagher, 2015).

The UN Charter, on the other hand, does not specifically recognise the right to use force to defend a state's people against its own ruling authority, even when faced with genocide, enormous internal

and external population displacements, widespread violence, and catastrophic hunger. In the post-Cold War period, the UN Security Council approved humanitarian action in Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1992), and Rwanda (1993). (1994). It is worth noting, however, that while the circumstances in each case are different, they share one significant motive: the Security Council determined that human rights violations in these countries posed a threat to international peace and security, and thus the Council invoked the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Gallagher (2015). According to Downes (2010), the following are significant instances of human rights breaches in Syria: unlawful killing, including of children (mostly boys), medical personnel and hospital patients ("In some particularly grave instances, entire families were executed in their homes");

1. use of chemical weapons on unarmed civilians;
2. torture, including of children (mostly boys, sometimes to death) and hospital patients, and including sexual and psychological torture;
3. arbitrary arrest "on a massive scale";
4. deployment of tanks and helicopter gunships in densely populated areas;
5. heavy and indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas;
6. collective punishment;
7. enforced disappearances;
8. wide scale and systematic destruction and looting of property;
9. the systematic denial, in some areas, of food and water; and
10. the prevention of medical treatment, including to children - in the period since 15 March 2011

According to Gallagher (2015), the number of civilian casualties from airstrikes and artillery fell marginally after internationally negotiated ceasefires in February and September, but only temporarily, and illegal assaults on civilians by all sides to the war continued throughout the year. Syrian and Russian warplanes used wide-area explosives, barrel bombs, cluster munitions, and combustible incendiary weapons to target or attack civilian locations, including residences, marketplaces, schools, and hospitals. Human Rights Watch reported multiple apparent targeted assaults on homes, medical institutions, marketplaces, and schools throughout 2016, including a significant bombardment by the Syrian-Russian alliance on al-Quds Hospital and nearby neighbourhoods on April 27, 2016, killing 58 people and patients. Several assaults on health institutions occurred in August alone, notably in Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and Homs (Downes, 2010).

The Syrian-Russian combined military operations, which started on September 30, 2015, have also widely deployed cluster bombs, which are prohibited by international law (Gallagher, 2015). Most countries have banned cluster munitions because their submunitions fall over a large area, making it impossible to distinguish between fighters and civilians, and because many submunitions fail to explode and become de facto land mines that can explode if disturbed, even after many years if they are not cleared. Between June 5 and August 10, 2015, government troops and its allies used incendiary munitions in at least 18 verified strikes on opposition-held districts in Aleppo and Idlib (Gallagher, 2015). Incendiary weapons generate a chain reaction of chemical reactions that spark difficult-to-extinguish flames and excruciatingly painful burns that are difficult to cure (Pouliot, 2013). The Convention on Conventional Weapons protocol forbidding the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons in regions with a "concentration of population" has been approved by 113

nations, including Russia (but not Syria). While Russia continues to deny any participation in incendiary weapons assaults in Syria, Syria has consistently refused to sign the convention, and the use of incendiary weapons by its armed forces has been confirmed since the end of 2012. (Pouliot, 2013).

The notion of Responsibility to Defend highlights the UN's power to protect the lives and rights of individuals who are abused, like in Syria. As a result, the purpose of this research is to determine how this reconciles the protection of human rights on the one hand, with the values of the UN Charter on the other, such as state sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force. Thus, Welsh (2013) notes that these interventions have raised difficult questions about whether the UN Security Council's actions in cases of humanitarian crises or massive human rights violations within a member state's territory are legal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or whether the Security Council's competence to use force under Chapter VII (which describes the United Nations Security Council's powers to maintain peace and further determines the existence of the Security Council's powers to maintain peace (Ganghof, 2014). The siege of civilian areas by government and pro-government troops, as well as armed opposition groups, continued throughout 2016, as did the blockage of humanitarian assistance.

Before entering certain locations, the Syrian government continues to require relief organisations to go through a bureaucratic permission procedure. In the past, the UN proved ineffectual at putting an end to human rights violations on a global scale. The United Nations considered widespread human tragedy inside state boundaries to be a domestic concern. According to Wiseman (2015), in the absence of international protections against atrocities such as human rights violations, countries might commit crimes against humanity with impunity as long as they stayed inside their own borders.

As a result, the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations (UN) found in its fourth report, published in 2017, that Syrian government troops used chemical weapons in an assault in Idlib in March 2015. (Wiseman, 2015). The investigation also identified the military units responsible for flights linked to the strikes, but it was unable to identify the commanders owing to the Syrian government's unwillingness to answer to critical questions. The joint investigation has already found the same conclusion for two additional assaults in 2014 and 2015. The investigation already discovered that ISIS used sulphur mustard gas in an August 2015 strike on territory controlled by armed opposition forces.

According to Baker, approximately 117,000 people have been imprisoned or vanished since 2011, the great majority by government authorities, including 4,557 between January and June of this year (2014). Torture and ill-treatment are common in prison institutions, and hundreds have perished there. International political tensions over Syria have been lethal. The Security Council has not only failed to carry out its primary job of maintaining international peace and security, but it has also failed miserably to respect its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the Syrian people. At the 2005 United Nations World Summit, all states pledged to maintain their duty to protect by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

As a result, the goal of this research is to highlight the role of the United Nations Security Council in defending the human rights of people living in war-torn areas. This is against the background of arbitrary arrest, ill-treatment, torture, and forced disappearances by government forces, which remain common and systematic phenomena in Syria and occur in an atmosphere of impunity. Torture, abuse, malnutrition, beatings, and sickness are all common causes of death in government

imprisonment, with at least 12,679 people dying in captivity between March 2011 and June 2015 (Abramson, 2015). This research work focuses on the Security Council interventions involving internal armed conflicts in which widespread human rights violations occur, with particular analysis of the Syrian crisis.

Research Questions

The following research questions were stated to guide the study:

- 1) What are the conditions that could permit the deployment of military intervention for human rights protection purposes in the Syrian crisis?
- 2) What are the United Nations' Humanitarian intervention efforts in the Syrian crisis?
- 3) What are the factors that have impinged on the United Nations' Security Council's efforts at resolving the Syrian crisis?

Objectives of the study

The primary aim of this study is to unravel the role played by the United Nations Security Council in her quest to protect the human rights of those involved in the Syrian Crisis. Specifically, the following under listed objectives will guide this study;

- 1) examine the conditions that could permit the deployment of military intervention for human rights protection purposes in the Syrian crisis
- 2) examine the United Nations' Humanitarian intervention efforts in the Syrian crisis
- 3) investigate the factors that have impinged on the United Nations' Security Council's efforts at resolving the Syrian crisis

II. Literature Review

Security

Security is a state of freedom from danger or threats to the individual and corporate existence of the citizens and nations. The safeguarding of the territorial integrity of any nation is guaranteed by the concept of collective security as a threat to one nation is a threat to all. It is one of the instruments for global pacification that predated the United Nations as Israel of old, Greece, Roman empires of old practiced limited systems of collective security. It was in 1919 that the first major attempt of collective security was adopted through the establishment of the League of Nations. According to Fabian (1971) rules, customs, and norms or common practices that have been accepted as law, whether municipal or international, are aimed at eliciting the right behavior" The refusal to comply with the law, therefore, carries sanctions, as laws may be nothing but mere rhetoric and ineffective verbal expressions without the requisite force for implementation through binding provisions in sanctions and rewards. This is so as good conducts are to be rewarded and bad behaviors are punished to serve as deterrence.

The principle of collective security rests on the assumption that all nations want peace and they therefore share the primary responsibility to maintain peace. This assumption cannot be correct in all cases as the national interest of all nations cannot be compatible as there may be contending issues particularly for the Super powers. The economic, Political, military and cultural aspirations of nations differs and efforts are made to strike a healthy balance through the balance of powers and moral persuasion. The principle of balance of power and the concept of collective security are to guarantee peace through the prevention of war. To achieve peace in the face of numerous

challenges, there is need for the cooperation of all. Ogonor (2000, p.127-128) said "one of the assumptions of collective security holds that all members in a system must agree in advance to react promptly and effectively against threats to peace and must be organized in such a way as to provide the procedure for collective response to such threats. As with alliances, the aggressor nation will be faced with such overwhelming opposition from all other members of the system that peace will be promptly restored" He went on to say". The United Nations may have committed its members into actual battle as in the case of Korea (Uniting for Peace Resolution) in 1950, the Congo crisis of 1960, (ONUC) and the Gulf war(Operation Desert Storm),but the mission of the United Nations is to maintain peace and security. This is not happening as one superpower or the other out of selfish interest will support and encourage recalcitrant behaviors after wrongdoing and that is where veto and clandestine support comes into play regularly to make the globe insecure in recurrent security challenges.

There are covert and overt operations to support wrongdoing depending on the parties involved. This is the genesis of insecurity and threat to peace. Several scholars have written on the reward and sanction systems and one of them Claude (1967) said when sanctions and rewards are applied to international relations, there are inherent difficulties as to whether or not, nations may obey internal law for fear of sanctions or for the sole reason that compliance may be better when weighed under the game strategy of maximum and minimum losses to be incurred by not obeying the law. Nations weigh the gains of any action and the negative reactions to it and this is why Falk,(1962) said the United States state Department always try to justify its action in the foreign scene to American public and to the world even if it is shown to be against international law or standing rules. According to Arens and Laswell (1968) Sanction law is when there is a provision for the threat to use force to ensure compliance and reward contingent on good behavior. The dominant tendency for peace keeping operations is the product of the end of the cold war. Hart (2000) said regional security can be guaranteed by collaboration by all stakeholders with strong continental powers supporting the cause for peace both militarily and economically like the role of Nigeria in the West African and African region which was enabled by its petrol dollars.

According to Hart (2022) "looking at the nature of this crisis, shows that they are mostly rooted in their internal democratic processes and violent religious extremism, and ethnic rivalries accentuated by selfish leaders' intent to cling to power". The origin of conflicts that always start as an internal domestic disagreement or border disputes are traceable to these factors and external factors escalated them to crises. Therefore, return to the causal factors is the only sustainable path to address the conflict situations and bring peace and collective security to all conflict areas.

Peace

Peace is a situation where there is no threat to lives and properties and where people are not living in fear (Hart, 2022). There is an obligation to maintain peace and where there is conflict, what is required is to settle it. Due to the complexities of conflicts, immediate settlement may not be feasible and the process to bring it to an end comes into play in strategic long and short time plans. In ideal peacekeeping operations, the primary objective is not to defeat the aggressor or any of the parties to the conflict but to prevent war and if there is a war already, to form a barricade to stop further hostilities, maintain a sustainable ceasefire and work towards a no victor, no vanquished situation to allow healing to take place. This can only be achieved through diplomatic platforms and channels. The balance of power that comes with mutually assured destruction was the order of the day during the cold war and the world was more peaceful than in the post-cold war era. This position was advanced by the United Nations (1993, p.96) and Time International Magazine (1993) agreed that the United Nations has done so much to maintain peace amongst nations by establishing

and sending several peace operations to troubled zones since 1948 and the demand for peace operations after the cold war has increased tremendously as 13 new peace operations were set up within 1988 and 1992 and when this is compared with 13 such operations over the previous 40 years, it means that the world had more peace during the cold war era. The actors at the International levels are the Nations and it is their actions and inactions that guarantees peace and security as both are tied together. When there is requisite security, there is corresponding peace. Nations have a duty to maintain the highest level of discipline and high moral standing.

According to Henkins (1979, p.52) every nation's foreign policy depends substantially on its credit on maintaining the expectations that it will live up to international morals and obligations. Consideration of honour, prestige, leadership, influence, reputation, which figure prominently in government decision, often weigh in favour of obeying the law. Nations generally desire a reputation for principled behavior, for propriety and respectability. It is when nations act respectably and with principles that there is peace. The obedience to law is a responsible and respectable act and the absence of that brings conflicts and the resulting insecurity.

Concept of Human Rights

Jack Donnelly defined human rights as literally the right that one possesses just because one is human, he differed from the previous thinkers. When he explains that human rights are rights, not benefits, duties, privileges, or some other possibly related practise, he puts the definition on a balanced scale without bias. Persons' rights, in turn, are particular entitlements (Donnelly, 1998). Human rights, he believes, are universal, equal, and inalienable since they are founded on nothing more than being human. They are universally held by all human beings, and no matter how inhumane the abuse one may get, one is entitled to and empowered by human rights (Donnelly, 1995)

As a result, we might argue that human rights, when held by everyone against the state and society, offer a foundation for political structure and political legitimacy. In an environment where they are often ignored, demands of human rights may be revolutionary. The agitations of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), and other organisations in Nigeria's Niger delta area demonstrate this (Abanee, 2005).

Laski and Donnelly's perspective of human rights is a typical example of western academia and their thought on human rights has been termed as the 'liberal stance'. According to Chris' point of view, a summary of human rights may be regarded as follows:

- a) Human beings possess rights to life, liberty, possession of property, freedom of speech and so on.
- b) The primary function of government is to protect these rights, political institutions are to be judged on their performance of this function, and political obligation rests on their success in these- in fact political life is based on a kind of explicit contract between people and government Chris, (1997).

Human rights, according to Stark (1989), are intentionally recognised norms of behaviour of states and other persons in international law. Buergenthal also defines human rights as the law that protects individuals and groups from violations of government policy. Buergenthal, (1988). (1988). Granston defines human rights as "moral rights that all men have, which no one may be deprived of without serious affront to justice, and which are owed to every human being simply because he is human" (Granston, 1973). Wasserstrom (2012) identifies four characteristics that human rights must possess: To begin with, it must be possessed by all humans as well as only humans. Second, it

must be equally available to all humans. Third, because human beings have human rights, we can rule out as potential candidates any rights that one might have by virtue of holding a particular position or relationship, such as parent or president. Finally, if any human rights exist, they have the additional characteristic of being assertive (Wasserstrom, 2012).

Human rights, in a more humane interpretation, are seen as necessary conditions that individuals and society as a whole must strive to achieve and maintain in order for society to progress. Human rights are rights that are necessary conditions of self-realization, and because of their singular importance, individuals are entitled to, indeed, required to claim them, and society is enjoined, better yet, obliged to allow them; otherwise, the quality of life is seriously compromised (p.32)

According to Osita (1984), it is seen in terms of demands or claims made by individuals or groups on society. He claims that human rights are demands or claims made by individuals or groups on society, some of which protect the law and have become norms, while others remain aspirations to be realised in the future (Osita, 1984, p.21)

Both Ake and Osita are African scholars whose perspectives on human rights reflect the African perspective. Their position is viewed as a necessary condition for the human race's emancipation toward the development of man's capacity. As a result, we can comprehend why there is upheaval in the Niger Delta. Furthermore, this expresses the current level of development in Africa, as well as their thinking and aspirations. In this regard, the Ogoni people, and indeed the entire Niger Delta, are not left out.

One notable difference between Western and African perspectives on human rights is that the West has long prioritised political and civil rights, whereas Africans have prioritised economic and social justice (George, 1990). Thus, it is correct to state that human rights are indivisible and independent; however, it has been observed that civil and political rights have received far more attention, legal codification, and judicial interpretation, and have been instilled in public consciousness, than economic, social, and cultural rights (HRC, 1993).

Humanitarian Intervention

Stowell (2011) have described humanitarian intervention as the reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another State from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice. The French international legal philosopher Rougier (1987), for example, published *The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention*," and stated that:

The theory of intervention on the ground of humanity... recognizes the right of one State to exercise an international control over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the laws of humanity.

The United Nations in 1945 outlined any threat or use of force between States, for any reason except in four explicit situations in which the use of force is permitted. These are:

- 1) The use of force in unilateral self-defence and in collective self-defence in accordance with article 51;
- 2) The use of force authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII;
- 3) The use of force undertaken by the five members pursuant to Article 106 of the Charter; and,

- 4) Enforcement measures under regional arrangements or by regional agencies under Article 53 of the Chapter VIII.

Article 2 of the United Nations Charter recognises state sovereignty; Article 2(4) states that all members shall refrain in their international relations from threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the United Nations' purposes. Article 2(4) is also the most emphatic Charter provision against military involvement. Furthermore, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter precludes the UN from intervening in disputes inside any State's internal authority. This criterion also applies to inter-state interactions. The restriction on the threat or use of force by one state against the internal affairs of other nations has caused much debate in the international community. Although the UN Charter does not expressly forbid the use of humanitarian intervention, its general clause that strongly condones the use of force by one State against another effectively excludes such intervention. It is worth noting that after the ratification of the UN Charter, resolutions were enacted admitting the illegality of humanitarian intervention.

The Concept of Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a principle that tries to guarantee that the international community never again fails to act in the face of genocide and other grave violations of human rights. The term "R2P" was approved by the United Nations General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit (UN, 2010; Owen & Dey, 2011) The principle is founded on three pillars: first, that states have an obligation to protect their citizens from mass atrocities; second, that the international community should assist them in doing so; and third, that if the state in question fails to act appropriately, the international community of states bears responsibility. Badescu, (2010). (2010). R2P should be seen as a serious pledge made by leaders of all countries to all men and women who are threatened by mass crimes. R2P will be rigidly applied to four categories of mass atrocities: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Judeson, 2012).

The notion that governments must intervene to avert mass crimes, with the assistance of the international community, lies at the core of this new standard.

Equally essential is the notion that concerned outsiders should assist nations in preventing these heinous violations using "diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful methods," as defined by the UN charter. This might involve increasing governmental capacity via economic support, rule-of-law reform, and the establishment of political institutions, among other things; or, when violence has started or seems to be on the horizon, by direct acts of mediation. The extensive diplomatic engagement after Kenya's disputed election, or the action of neighbours and the UN to help Burundi's government, both highlight the need of collaborative efforts to avert massacres. Only when such efforts have failed can the international community, working via the Security Council, resort to more forceful measures. These might include unilateral actions such as economic penalties or the threat of sanctions, as well as weapons embargoes. If peaceful measures fail to safeguard the population and the state is clearly failing to defend its people, the Security Council will consider using armed action. A timely intervention may have halted, if not averted, the murderous nightmare in Rwanda, as well as perhaps in Cambodia and other places. However, in many other circumstances when the amount of abuse exceeds the R2P threshold, the best course of action is significantly less apparent. To help guide such decisions, the ICISS report and the Secretary-in General's Larger Freedom proposed five "precautionary principles" or "criteria of three legitimacies": the violence in question must include large-scale actual or threatened loss of life or ethnic cleansing; the purpose of the intervention must be to prevent or halt suffering; military force

must be the last resort; the means must be commensurate with the ends sought; and the intervention must have a justification. Governments failed to reach an agreement on the inclusion of precautionary principles in the World Summit Outcome Document. As a result, there are currently no publicly acknowledged principles, much alone voluntary ones, to govern Security Council decision making. These principles, however, may and should continue to shape public discussion and government considerations (Haines & George, 2010)

III. Theoretical Framework

The research is based on Neo-classical Realism. As Morgenthau (1970) argues, one of the assumptions of Neo-classical Realism is that all human beings innately desire to expand their power. The power-seeking propensity of humans generates a system in which politicians compete for control over other governments. "Politics is a fight for power over men," Morgenthau (1975) contends, "and the forms of obtaining, keeping, and exhibiting it constitute the style of political activity." States are constantly concerned with national concerns such as security and riches in international politics.

Success, according to Morgenthau, is "the degree to which one is able to preserve, grow, or display one's authority over others." In contrast to neo-classical realism, which emphasises human nature, neo-realism concentrates on an anarchic international system in which no central authority regulates international affairs. Waltz (2002), a famous neo-realist academic, contends that under a self-help international system, a state's foreign policy is governed by its national interests. States undertake ongoing attempts to protect their interests and secure their existence since no one can be depended on to ensure their survival in the self-help system. Tucker contends that when governments acquire influence in international affairs, their interests grow. Waltz (2002), like Morgenthau, contends that success entails the maintenance and re-enforcement of the state's authority. In conclusion, traditional neo-realism emphasises power-seeking human nature, while neo-realism emphasises an anarchic international system. Despite their disparate foci, both strands provide insight on nations' national objectives and desire to expand their authority.

In contrast to realists' emphasis on the state as a significant player, liberalism stresses human rights protection. Classical liberals, such as Waltz, maintain that humans have basic rights to liberty, which include the freedom to do whatever they see proper to sustain themselves, as long as they do not infringe on the rights and liberties of others, except if and when their own survival is threatened.

People have the right to be considered as ethical subjects and the need to treat others as such. Another fundamental premise of liberalism is that governments may work together for mutual benefit. While liberals recognise that each individual or state wants personal benefit, they think that people have certain interests that may lead to local and international cooperation. To buttress their case, liberals point to the rise of international institutions such as the United Nations as evidence of the predominance of inter-state cooperation.

Contemporary liberal internationalism is one of the liberalism strands debating the legitimacy of humanitarian action. A key researcher in this stream, Walz (2002), argues that military action might be permissible as a last option and as a way of protecting people from human rights abuses such as genocide and crimes against humanity. However, such intervention should not be carried out unilaterally, but rather multilaterally with the approval of the UN Security Council, because liberal internationalists believe that multilateralism prevents great powers from intervening in the name of national interests rather than humanitarian goals.

IV. Research Methodology

The Historical and Descriptive Research Designs were used in this research. This included investigating previous occurrences in order to draw conclusions and make predictions about the future. The stages in historical research are as follows: develop a concept, develop a strategy, collect data, analyse data, and investigate data sources.

According to the current analysis, the Syrian conflict began in 2011. As a result, statistics from the beginning of the crisis through 2017 are necessary. These are compiled on a regular basis from published works, newspapers, encyclopaedias, magazines, government policy documents, conference proceedings, reports, memoranda, unpublished dissertations, letters, documents, international journals, policy statements, yearly reports, and other sources. The secondary data gathered would be properly analysed for substance. Because of the nature of the phenomena under inquiry, this approach of analysis is required for the study.

V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Research Question One: What are the conditions that could permit the deployment of military intervention for human rights protection purposes in the Syrian crisis?

In answering this question, it may be necessary to give an overview of the crisis in Syria. This is with a view to showing the nature of the crisis, the casualty level and devastations occasioned by the crisis.

Responsibility to Protect (R2p) and the Syrian Crisis

Based on previous experience, particularly in Rwanda, the UN has started to approve forced humanitarian action in situations when world peace and security are threatened. The existence of such a threat allows the Security Council to circumvent Article 2(7) and provide it with a justifiable basis for intervention in situations of gross violation of human rights within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Through a comprehensive explanation of what may constitute a "threat to peace," the UN Security Council, with the support of the international community, has included gross human rights violations, obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid, and obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid. This viewpoint is supported by the Security Council's humanitarian action in crises such as Iraq-Kurdistan, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Now, we'll compare to see whether the Syrian conflict falls within Article VII, which might prompt the international community to intervene to safeguard lives and property..

The Syrian Civil War and Humanitarian Disaster

Since the war started in 2011, there have been recurrent demands for an intervention in Syria similar to the intervention in Libya based on the humanitarian concept of the Responsibility to Protect. However, the UN Security Council has frequently failed to achieve an agreement on this subject owing to Russia's and, to a lesser degree, China's resistance. This has prompted appeals for humanitarian assistance, especially in light of disclosures that the Assad administration deployed chemical weapons against civilians. Any use of force without UNSC authorization would be an unlawful breach of Article 2(4), although there are very compelling reasons in favour of action.

"Sovereignty cannot be a cover for dictators to perpetrate wanton murder, or an excuse for the international community to turn a blind eye to carnage," President Obama said in a UN speech. "Should we truly accept the concept that the world is impotent in the face of a Rwanda or Srebrenica genocide?" (Obama, 2013). This is possibly the most compelling case in favour of

intervention: if the international community does nothing, we might see mass carnage that dwarfs any previous domestic conflict.

According to the Washington Post, five of the best reasons for striking Syria are as follows: punishing Assad for using chemical weapons, discouraging future dictators from using chemical weapons, discouraging Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, forcing Assad to the negotiating table, and putting an end to the bloodshed (Klein, 2013). While each of these goals is justified to some degree, the ultimate goal of any humanitarian action must be to end the country's continuous suffering. Using humanitarian intervention or the Responsibility to Protect as a justification for launching a military offensive to punish the Assad regime or bring about regime change would seriously undermine the doctrine's credibility and legitimacy, making other states wary of sanctioning such intervention in the future. As a result, while deciding whether or not to act militarily on humanitarian grounds, the rationale for such intervention must be properly analysed, reasoned, and justified using evidence (Klein, 2013).

Former US Department of State legal adviser Harold Koh has suggested that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter possibly allows for the use of force outside the limits of the Charter if the UNSC 'obstructs the UN's ability to fulfil its proclaimed humanitarian, anti-war aims' (Koh, 2013). This is a legal murky area, but it is here that the case for humanitarian action may be made. The United States was a major proponent of involvement in Syria, and Koh has outlined the American perspective on operations that exceed the limits of the Charter. In the opinion of the United States, action in Syria would be justified if:

1. The humanitarian crisis creates consequences significantly disruptive of international order creates an imminent threat to the acting nations, giving rise to an urgent need to act in individual and collective self-defence under Article 51. This would apply in Syria as a result of the use of chemical weapons, the high number of refugees and the destabilization of the region
2. A Security Council resolution was not available due to persistent veto and all other remedies had been exhausted. In this case, Russia continue to block any proposed action and diplomatic negotiations have thus far failed to reach peace in the country
3. Force used is limited to genuine humanitarian purposes necessary and proportionate to address the imminent threat.
4. The action is collective and not one state acting unilaterally. Utilizing the General Assembly's Uniting for Peace Procedure or regional arrangements under Chapter VIII would demonstrate this
5. Force used would prevent the use of per se illegal means by the state, in this case chemical weapons
6. Force would be used to prevent a per se illegal end, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity and avert a humanitarian disaster. Whilst essentially each of these have already occurred in Syria, humanitarian intervention would prevent them from getting worse.

Furthermore, respected judge Antonio Cassese has advocated a right of humanitarian intervention where 6 conditions are fulfilled:

1. There have been gross and egregious human rights breaches leading to the loss of hundreds or thousands lives and amounting to crimes against humanity. These atrocities are carried out by the central government or because the government has collapsed and cannot prevent them

2. The crimes against humanity result from anarchy in the state. The government consistently refuses to comply with the UN.
3. The Security Council is unable to take any action due to disagreement or the use of the veto.
4. All peaceful avenues have been explored
5. A collective group of states take action with the support (or at least non-objection) of a majority of UN member states
6. Force is used for the sole purpose of ending the atrocities and restoring human rights (Cassese, 2013).

Table 2: Number of Deaths in the Syrian Crisis

SOURCE	NO. OF CASUALTIES	PERIOD
United Nations	220,000 killed	15/03/11 – 15/03/15
Syrian Network for Human Rights	211,000 killed	15/03/11 – 15/03/15
Centre for documentation of violation	131,237 killed	15/03/11 – 15/03/15
Syrian observatory for Human Rights	215,518 – 300,518 killed	15/03/11 – 15/03/15

The table two above shows a summary of total number of deaths from various sources between 15th March 2011 and 15th March 2015. The table only shows us a cumulative death figures since 2011 when the war began. But the table below gives us the number of deaths per year

Table 3: Number of Deaths between, 2011-2017

Year	No. of Deaths
2011	7,841
2012	49,294
2013	73,447
2014	76,021
2015	55,219
2016	49,742
2017	33,425

Source: Compiled by the author from data from Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR, 2015), Gladstone and Ghannam, 2015; SOHR, 2017).

The chart above (table three) illustrates that the mortality toll grew each year, peaked in 2014, and then started to fall from 2015 to 2017. Aside from those who were slain, there were also individuals who were injured throughout the civil war. According to Elizabeth Hoff, World Health Organization's Syrian representative, the total number of injured as of December 2014 reached at one million (Gladstone and Ghannam, 2015). She also stated that the UN was seeking \$8.4 billion in 2015 to assist over 18 million victims of Syria's wars, the majority of whom were displaced civilians and refugees.

According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Syria's agricultural economy, which previously accounted for 18 percent of yearly GDP, has now been cut in half as a result of the war. Furthermore, prior to the crisis, the tourist industry employed around 270,000 people, but currently employs none. Given the severity of the conflict in Syria, as well as the number of fatalities and damage it produced, UN-sanctioned and controlled military intervention in the nation was justified. The Syrian issue obviously met the criteria for using the R2P theory.

While we would not recommend a tick-box exercise to justify humanitarian action outside the boundaries of the Charter, it is apparent that the instance of Syria is an example of when humanitarian intervention should have been used. Most experts believe that any humanitarian action in Syria without UNSC authorization would be illegal under existing international law. Given the severity of the humanitarian disaster caused by the Assad regime's activities, it may be regarded a "legitimate" intervention, such as in Kosovo.

Any proposed interventions, whether in Syria or any other future conflict, that do not have UNSC authorization should thus be treated with caution and thorough consideration, given that there is currently no sound legal basis for intervention, even if the human rights justifications are overwhelming. This report, however, believes that military involvement in Syria to stop the continued grave human rights abuses might be justifiable owing to the country's continuous destruction. Furthermore, this study believes that a change in the law is needed to create a legal basis for humanitarian intervention outside of the collective security framework, which may necessitate States acting in violation of current international law and intervening militarily to prevent or stop gross human rights violations where the UN Security Council has failed to authorise such intervention.

Research Question II: What are the United Nations' Humanitarian intervention efforts in the Syrian crisis?

Since the crisis began in 2011, the UN has made various efforts, both directly and indirectly, to mediate and put the crisis to an end. For example, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan developed a peace plan in Syria while serving as the UN Arab League Joint Special Representation. The failure was largely due to the Assad government's obstinacy, which sent its military forces to attack several forces and villages, killing scores of people; continued incommunicado detention of people, including children; and used attack helicopters against rebel forces while negotiations were ongoing. (Amnesty International, April/June 2012).

Furthermore, several members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) have attempted multiple times to reach an agreement, with the United Kingdom (UK), France, Portugal, and Germany circulating a draught resolution on the Syrian crisis in late May 2011. This proposal, which was considered in June and July of 2011, criticised systemic violations of human rights, called on the Syrian government to uphold human rights and international humanitarian law, and emphasised the Syrian government's obligation to protect its inhabitants. However, China and Russia said that the document was too contentious, and other UNSC members such as Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa expressed their opposition to the plan (Warsnip, 2011). The UN Security Council has also issued a Presidential Statement condemning violence and the use of force against civilians; however, in an unusual move, Lebanon allowed the statement to be made but formally distanced itself from it, stating that the Presidential Statement would not help to address the situation in Syria.

Another Presidential Statement from the UN Security Council offered complete support for Annan's mediation efforts. Syria approved the Annan proposal since it did not allow for the next round of UN Security Council negotiations to include coercive measures. The agreed date for a complete truce set by Annan has passed, yet violence against civilians has persisted. The UN Security Council issued resolutions that called for the deployment of an advanced team of 30 unarmed United Nations military observers and indicated support for Annan's proposal, however the phrasing differed. The text from the United States and its partners criticised human rights violations and expressed remorse for those slain, but the Russian draught did not. Furthermore,

with the presence of UN monitors in Syria, the violence escalated. The UN Supervision Mission in Syria has been stopped due to an upsurge in violence, and monitors have been targeted. Despite reports of continuous aggression, deaths, violence, and humanitarian crises, the UN Security Council has been unable to implement several proposed resolutions in order to maintain global peace and security. Furthermore, two peace meetings on the Syria crisis, the 2015 Geneva Conference II and the 2016 Geneva Conference III, have failed (Oludoun, 2014).

Research Question III: What are the factors that have impinged on the United Nations' Security Council's efforts at resolving the Syrian crisis?

According to Cunningham (2013) there is a strong correlation between the self-interest of actors involved in a conflict and the duration of the conflict. Civil wars are thought to be extremely difficult conflicts to solve. The difficulty increases even more if the conflict involves multiple-players who have the ability to stall the settlement and carry on with the combat. This is the case with the Syrian war. The national interests of the United States and Russia-both permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), with Veto Power- have more than anything else, circumscribed the effectiveness of the UNSC with respect to the Syrian crisis (Solomon, 2015).

United States' interest in Syria

According to the Wall Street Journal (2013), the argument for US intervention in Syria goes well beyond humanitarian concerns. The United States has a crucial interest in defeating Bashar Assad in order to prevent him and his supporters from developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which would endanger American allies and regional stability.

Furthermore, a win for Assad would be a success for Iran and its supporters, which would be detrimental to even American friends in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia. It should be mentioned that Saudi Arabia is the United States' most powerful Arab partner in the Middle East. Furthermore, the majority of American oil purchases are made in the nation.

Again, the US was alarmed by Assad's use of chemical weapons on its citizens, not only because of their destructive nature (opposition groups claim that bombs and guns have done the majority of the killings in Syria), but also because chemical weapons are designed to instil fear in the hearts of the people. And they (the US) reasoned that a state that employs terror weaponry had ties to terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah.

This organisation (Hezbollah) has already murdered hundreds of American citizens and launched fatal attacks on nations such as India, Bulgaria, and Argentina, displaying its worldwide reach. (2013) (Wall Street Journal). Allowing Assad to triumph would send the wrong signal to other rogue governments, and American civilians may be targeted for destruction as well.

Again, the United States must engage in Syria to prevent the nation from becoming a base and training ground for the next generation of terrorists. Nationals from other Western nations including the United States have already migrated to Syria to join ISIL. There is also concern that such people would return to their own nations and pose a danger. For example, CBN News reporter Bob Orr reported that more than 100 Americans have travelled to Syria to join the Jihadists (Orr, 2014)

Also, Assad's triumph would give Iran, his main regional sponsor, more motivation to accelerate its nuclear projects, since the Mullahs and Revolution Guards in Iran would decide that even the US would be unable to stop them (WSJ, 2013).

Again, a win for Assad would diminish the United States' national pride and prestige. President Obama designated a "red line" for Assad in August 2012, which Assad violated when he deployed

chemical weapons on his population. Failure to attack Assad would depict the US as weak, and its credibility will be put into doubt (Ollivant, 2013).

Closely related to the preceding point is the fact that there is an international treaty prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Though Syria did not sign the treaty, its overwhelming support by the majority of the world's states makes it an international norm for which Syria could be held accountable. Allowing Assad to walk free might encourage other nations to acquire and use these weapons, which would be detrimental to the US. Enforcing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a critical national interest, according to US policymakers (Ollivant, 2013).

Furthermore, the development and enforcement of democracy is a critical US interest. And since August 11, 2011 the U.S President has proclaimed that "a democratic Syria without Bashar al-Assad" should be his objective.

Finally, Syria's strategic geographical position may be of equal relevance to the US. Syria borders Turkey and Israel, has strong ties with Iran and Russia (both of whom are US adversaries), plays a prominent role in Lebanon, and has a history of conflict with Iraq until recently. Syria is an important link in the Iran-Hezbollah alliance. As a result, the US opted to interfere in Syria primarily to protect these interests. The involvement includes the imposition of sanctions as well as the employment of military air attacks.

Russia's interest in the Syrian crisis

Russia's engagement in Syria stems from a strong economic interest. Russia does have an economic stake in Syria to defend, which explains its backing for the Assad administration. The Russians see the Syrian conflict as profitable. Russia's weapons industry sold about \$1 billion in guns to Syria in 2011, and there are around \$4 billion in unresolved contracts. Again, Russian businesspeople have extensive economic relationships with Syrians. As Syria's industrial sector ruins as a result of the conflict and the ensuing Western sanctions, the Assad administration relies entirely on Russian imports. Syria-Russia commerce increased by 58% in 2011 to \$1.97 billion, according to estimates (Groshekov, 2012). Furthermore, Russia's sole marine presence in the Mediterranean is in Tartous, Syria's port city. This collaboration began in 1971, and Tartous was transformed into a permanent Russian base in 2008. As a result, Russia's backing for the Assad government is aimed at ensuring the regime's continued access to this vital naval facility (Manfreda, 2016).

Furthermore, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations is a basic concept of Russian diplomacy. Russia believes that NATO flagrantly violated this principle in Libya in 2011 and does not want a replay in Syria. Ironically, although Russia claims to be upholding the UN Charter's principle of non-intervention, she is secretly backing one side (the Assad government) in the fight, as we have already said.

Russia has frequently used its veto authority to prevent the United Nations from interfering in Syria, prolonging the conflict (source: <http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>). And the longer the battle lasts, the more money Russia gets from weaponry sales. As a result, this analysis concludes that the competition between the United States and Russia has had the greatest impact on the UN Security Council's attempts to preserve human rights in Syria.

VI. Summary of Major Findings

Based on the data collected and analysed, the following findings are highlighted:

- 1) Based on the responsibility to protect enshrined in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, the international community could intervene if there is four types of mass atrocities: genocide,

ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The principle rests on three pillars, first, that states have an obligation to protect their citizens from mass atrocities; second, that the international community should assist them in doing so; and, third, that, if the state in question fails to act appropriately, the responsibility to do so falls to international community of states

- 2) Despite reports regarding continued aggression, killings, violence and humanitarian crises, the UNSC has not been capable of executing various proposed resolutions to keep up with the overall peace and security in Syrian Civil War.
- 3) Difference among the five permanent members hindered the effectiveness of the UNSC in intervening in genocide and ethnic cleansings in Syria Civil War
- 4) The lack of consensus by the permanent members of the Security Council with the power of Veto came about because of the divergence of interest and mutual distrust caused by conflicting national interests between the American led western powers on one hand and the Russian and Chinese allies on the other hand.
- 5) The Russian and its allies unintended and American and its allies intended outcome of the Libyan past intervention that created more problems in the instability in Libya and spiral security challenges around its neighbours and beyond through the proliferation of weapons and mercenaries after the regime change.
- 6) The suspicion that the agenda of the western NATO members was more of regime change than maintenance of peace and security and the need not to allow that to happen again led to the several vetoes and inability to act decisively.

VII. Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite certain achievements in preventing the emergence of a worldwide war, the UN Security Council's participation in the Syrian crisis has been criticised. However, Ogonor (2000:158) opined that 'any criticism of the United Nations operations in this Yugoslavia crisis or any other crisis for that matter, should first of all address the question as to whether or not the world would have fared better in terms of crisis management without the United Nations'. He is not alone, as the Idealist school of thought believes in international law, international organisations, and diplomacy in conflict resolution, and the United Nations and, by extension, its specialised agencies, including the Security Council, serve as platforms and instruments for the implementation of its primary mandates. He went on to state, "That the United Countries' operations are governed by the principles of international law and peaceful coexistence among nations, and that using force in the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem, regardless of the explanation, is not legitimate." This was also true during the Libyan crisis, when the international community went above and beyond its authority, resulting in unintended consequences. This was also relevant to the Syrian problem, which required mutual honesty among the main state holders and Security Council permanent members. The application of maximum idealism and realism as a last option by all parties would have provided many chances in addressing some of the world's main challenges.

The current research focuses on the Syrian civil war. The results demonstrated that Syria's government, headed by Bashar Assad, has not only failed to defend its citizens' lives, but has also committed genocide against the very people it is supposed to protect. Most peace plans, including the Kofi Annan-led proposal, have been regularly and persistently thwarted by the government. The failure of that Annan-led peace plan was largely due to the Assad government's recalcitrance, which sent its military forces to attack several forces and villages, summarily killing scores of people; continued incommunicado detention of persons, including children; and use of attack

helicopters against rebel forces. Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2012) Indeed, the Syrian crisis has devolved into a humanitarian calamity, leaving the international community with little choice but to interfere via diplomatic, economic, political, and military sanctions. As a result, when it acted under the auspices of the United Nations, it produced a number of resolutions and statements urging the Assad dictatorship to protect the human rights of its citizens. The United States (and its allies) and Russia both engaged militarily, although belatedly. However, their initiatives had little effect on ending the conflict.

The power struggle between the United States and Russia, caused by their national interests, not only effectively limited the United Nations' capacity to intervene, but also worsened the situation. The US supported the 'rebels,' while Russia supported the Assad administration. Russia routinely used his veto power to prevent any resolution she deemed hostile to the Assad regime. The balkanization of the among the Veto Permanent Members has called the UN Security Council's legitimacy into question in cases where there is a significant violation of individuals' fundamental rights, particularly in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing, as there was in Syria during the Civil War.

Based on the conclusion highlighted above, the following findings were itemized:

1. Any interventions in the internal crisis in any country should be initiated and supervised by the U.N, who has the primary responsibility to maintain global peace and security. In the case of disagreement among the Veto members, diplomacy should be pursue without the given military support to any side in the conflict.
2. If the intervention is going to be military it should be adequate to end the crisis. That is to say there should be a military surge, the type that was implemented in Iraq by the Obama government. Incremental military support has the tendency to prolong the conflicts and increase its tempo and severity of devastation. There should be an international norm to forbid the sale of arms and ammunitions to warring factions in any State.
3. Build a coalition for the resettlement of refugees, starting with an increase in its own intake. Admitting 65,000 of the most vulnerable Syrian refugees would allow the United States to lead by example and would establish a foundation on which to re-build global commitments to burden-sharing.
4. Develop a regional and international vision for immediate humanitarian aid and long-term development assistance. Complex crises demand new and complex ways of thinking in order to explore workable interventions and credible responses; they further demand that policymakers look beyond the short term.
5. International leaders should be decisive in dealing with world's crises to prevent escalation. The world leaders have the political and military *will* to selflessly and decisively deal with developing security threats at regional and global levels before they escalate to become complex and lead to huge loss of lives and properties.

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