

Conflicts and Regional Underdevelopment: A Review of Lake Chad Basin Region

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Annotation: This paper has carefully examined conflicts and regional underdevelopment, a review of the Lake Chad Basin region. This work started out by exploring Nigeria's foreign policy and the counter-insurgency in the Chad Basin region. This paper makes it clear that Nigeria's foreign policy has been poised to end insurgency in this region. By providing an analysis of the historic dynamics of the Lake Chad Basin region and the common challenges that Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria face, this brief deconstructs common narratives around "violent extremism" held by the policy community; it provides a more nuanced explanation of the drivers of insurgency in the region; and it offers a set of recommendations to governments and policymakers on ways to manage the on-going crisis. Leaning largely on secondary sources, this paper used the Linkage approach to explain the need for states in the Chad Basin region to concertedly find solutions to the insurgency problem. The work that found insurgency has fueled instability and underdevelopment with attendant consequences across the Chad Basin region; and it has shattered the economic base of this region. Despite being vigorously fought, insurgency through Boko Haram remains resilient. Consequently, this paper recommended: adequate empowerment of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to eradicate insurgency in the region; awareness about the global and regional tide of terrorism as a precautionary measure; use of faith-based organisations to stop radicalization; use of coherent strategies that respond to the manifestations and the drivers of the insurgency; galvanising sustained political will and national commitment to deal with insurgency; bolstered civil-military co-operation to fight insurgency; and enhanced military cooperation across borders to fight insurgency in the Chad Basin region.

Keywords: Conflicts, Regional Underdevelopment, Lake Chad Basin Region, Counter Insurgency, Violent Extremism, Terrorism, Underdevelopment, and Military Cooperation.

1. Introduction

Nigeria's foreign policy towards counter-terrorism in the Chad Basin region has always tilted towards stopping it in concert with the relevant neighbours. Smith, Hadley and Dunne (2008) point out that "a country's foreign policy consists of self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve goals within its international relations milieu. The approaches are strategically employed to interact with other countries". An insurgent is "a person who, for political purposes, engages in armed hostility against an established government" (Garner et al, 2004). Consequently, Wood (2003) posits that "an insurgency is a rebellion against authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents (lawful combatants).

The foregoing definitive being obvious, it is proper to say that insurgency activities, championed by Boko Haram activities, in the Lake Chad Basin region of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, have impacted negatively on the security, socio-political and economic situations in the region. Boko Haram has carried out many gun attacks and bombings in many strategic places,

including the United Nations building in Abuja, the federal capital city. There have been similar attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, including a massive attack in Bosso in the Niger Republic with 26 soldiers killed in 2016 (Oluwadare, 2016).

Violent extremism emanating from insurgency has become the central challenge of governments in the Lake Chad Basin. Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria have launched joint military action to fight it. There is good reason: the impact of just one group, Boko Haram, alone on these countries is of an unprecedented scale. Nearly fifteen million civilians have been affected by the on-going insurgency and resulting military operations, which have left 27,000 dead and more than 2.4 million displaced since 2009 (Connor, 2017).

With Nigeria's foreign policy having been poised to counter-insurgency in the Chad Basin Region, President Goodluck Jonathan in 2013 launched a major offensive against Boko Haram, declaring a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States. While national forces claimed some success in pushing militants out of cities, attacks in rural areas continued with regularity (Johnson and Sergie, 2018).

Boko Haram attacks escalated in 2014 and 2015, raising doubts about the government's progress toward containing the group. In particularly brazen operations, the group claimed a bombing of an Abuja bus station that killed nearly one hundred people on April 14, 2014, the same day it abducted more than two hundred schoolgirls from the northeastern town of Chibok (Johnson and Sergie, 2018). The latter attack prompted an international outcry and evoked harsh criticism among many Nigerians of the Jonathan administration's slow response.

Elected president in 2015, Muhammadu Buhari has made some modest reforms to improve the military's effectiveness against Boko Haram. Buhari moved the military's headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri, increased funding for operations in the area, and appointed new military leadership. Nigeria has sought military support from its neighbors, who increasingly suffered attacks during Boko Haram's upsurge. Since 2015, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have deployed thousands of troops as part of a multinational force authorized by the African Union. The coalition has been credited with helping the Nigerian military retake much of the territory claimed by Boko Haram and reduce violence linked to the group to levels seen prior to 2014 (Johnson and Sergie, 2018).

Boko Haram has since spread its tentacles beyond the territories of Nigeria, maintaining sanctuaries and recruitment grounds in neighbouring countries (BBC News, 2015). The sect has also infiltrated communities and businesses and has also expanded its criminal activities and networks in northern Cameroon, southern Niger and Chad (Barna, 2014). The continuous presence of the group in northern Cameroon was proven with its attack on the Kolofata military base on January 12, 2015.

Sadly, the crisis is unfolding in a region already affected by severe underdevelopment, poverty and climate change. The impact on the lives of around 17 million people is devastating, with women, youth and children bearing the brunt. In 2018, more than 10 million people require humanitarian assistance and protection.

This paper is important because the Chad basin region as a system holds many natural and human endowments. The internal diversity of the Lake Chad region's system is fairly high. It is structured today by three main hubs: Lake Chad itself, a wetlands area with some two million inhabitants and high agro-halieuetic-pastoral potential; and two metropolises with seven-figure populations - N'Djaména, the Chadian capital, and Maiduguri, capital of the Nigerian State of Borno - which

head a network of secondary urban centres and rural markets (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos, 2018).

The system's interdependencies are based on flows (trade, migration, mobility, and investment) that transit between, on one side, the cities and the most productive, high-potential rural areas - albeit subject to varying demographic pressure depending on how long farming has been established - and less well-endowed areas on the other. The Lake Chad region consequently considered here covers an elongated area stretching approximately 1,000 kilometres (km) from north to south and 500 km from east to west, representing a surface area comparable to France. Rainfall is higher than 400 mm⁵ over only about half of this surface area. Demographic projections calculated from the most recent national censuses estimate the region's inhabitants at over 29 million in 2017 (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos, 2018).

Consequently, this seminar paper is poised to carefully explore Nigeria's foreign policy and the counter-insurgency in the Chad Basin region with the central intent of finding out the state of the crisis, the causative factors, effects and dimension, all of which will spur on the need to proffer solutions to bring this region once again to being a peaceful one that will permit development to thrive to the benefit of all stakeholders.

It is disheartening to note that, increasingly, the activities of insurgent groups in the Chad Basin region, especially Boko Haram, have become transnational terrorist movements. Its activities have continued to penetrate the fabrics of the society in and outside Nigeria. The permeating nature of the activities of Boko Haram provoked the concern of governments of the West African region. For example, prior to the formation of the multinational force, the Chadian President, Idriss Déby had in 2012, raised concern about the potentials of Boko Haram in terrorizing the entire Lake Chad Basin, if not contained. Reactions such as these motivated the mutual agreement to form a joint military force to confront the Boko Haram. The spill-over effects of the on-going Boko Haram activities on communities of Nigeria's immediate neighbours in Niger, Cameroon and Chad) have been so terrifying.

Boko Haram has continued to be a security risk to Nigeria and her neighbouring countries particularly, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and Cameroon within the West African sub-region (Adesoji, 2011). The security threat which Boko Haram poses to the rest of West Africa comes to the fore, even more, when Nigeria's geostrategic and economic importance is put into consideration. As the largest economy in West Africa, a threat to Nigeria's national and economic security is construed as a threat to the entire western African community. The leaky borderlines connecting the countries of the region make it easy for the effects of conflict or insecurity in one country to spill over to the other.

Besides, as insurgency escalates in the Chad Basin region, it prompts the dissipation of scarce resources that should have been used to develop the area to contain this phenomenon that has caused displacement of many people and communities, caused an alarming number of refugees and the attendant consequences, depleted the human and natural resources of this region much as it has permitted criminality to thrive to the underdevelopment of this area. Sadly, too, in spite of the huge resources expended to control insurgency in this region, the menace continues to spiral by the day and thus calling for more exhaustion of resources to the already underdeveloped region. This is really a pathetic situation.

Consequently, this paper is poised to carefully explore Nigeria foreign policy and the counter-insurgency in Chad Basin region with the central intent of proffering solutions that can help this

region as well as entire West African states to find pathways of ending the menaces of insurgent groups in the region.

II. Theoretical Framework

The theory used to guide this paper is the Linkage theory. Some exponents of this theory are scholars like Arthur A. Stein, Larry Crump, Klaus Segbers, J. Boone Bartholomees, and Ian Hall etc. The basic assumption of this theory is that Linkage is a facet of a two-party relationship, and its rigorous analysis requires a model of international interaction. It explores a state's policy of making its course of action concerning a given issue contingent upon another state's behavior in a different issue area (Stein, 1980).

The linkage paradigm finds its roots in the systems analysis school of thought. Emphasised in this theory is the mutual dependence that exists between the domestic and international systems (Frankel, 1972). The theory meddles into the link between domestic occurrences and their effects on the external environment by taking the spheres of national and international politics as interacting systems. This interpretation resonates with Rosenau (1969) who in his words described the linkage principle as "any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another". He described the initial stage of the linkage as 'input' and the terminal stage as 'output', which are differentiated according to their origins within the state their external environment.

The 'input' and 'output' are connected by three main varieties of linkages, namely: 'Penetrative'; 'Reactive'; and the 'Emulative' type of linkage (Rosenau, 1969). Penetrative linkage occurs when members of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another; it is followed by reactive linkage involving response and adjustment to polity output emanating from elsewhere (Adele, 2013; Adelusi, 2014). Penetrative linkage embraces political, military and economic penetration (Aduloju, 2014). Linkage becomes reactive when it is caused by boundary-crossing reactions without direct foreign participation in decisions made, while emulative linkage takes place when the response essentially assume the same as the action activating it.

The aggressive activities of Boko Haram in Chad Basin region has not only affected the security dynamics in Nigeria, but also affected by the group's uprisings is the insecurity it also constitutes to governments such as Niger, Chad and Cameroon in the Lake Chad Basin. These countries are vulnerable to Boko Haram insurgency. Boko Haram fighters have made communities around the Lake Chad basin their hideouts and recruitment grounds (Voice of America News, 2016). Nigeria's inability to extinct Boko Haram is what triggered the mutual reaction of countries in the Lake Chad Basin to reach an agreement on the formation of the multinational joint task force. This illustrates the 'penetrative' and 'reactive' notion of the linkage theory in which this paper finds a premise.

Relating this theory to this work, it is proper to say that Linkage theory can effectively explain the relationship between a negotiation and its relevant environment. The linkage approach derives explanatory utility in this study for a number of reasons. First, the theory is appropriate here for its ability to provide insight on the intricate link between domestic and external security issues, arising from the onslaughts of Boko Haram. Second, the theory neither contests nor overstates the relevance of national boundaries but rather, unveils the mutual interdependence between country borders and complex link between domestic and international event. The Linkage approach renders visible the external links and implications of the activities of Boko Haram. Over the years of active radicalism, Boko Haram has attained international recognition as a terrorist group with international allies including Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) etc. These factors

collectively underscore the efficacy of the Linkage approach as an analytical paradigm on this subject; and thus explains why it is preferred for application in this paper.

III. Methodology

This paper is going to apply the historical method. Historical method is the collection of techniques and guidelines that historians use to research and write histories of the past. Secondary sources, primary sources and material evidence such as that derived from archaeology may all be drawn on, and the historian's skill lies in identifying these sources, evaluating their relative authority, and combining their testimony appropriately in order to build as accurate and reliable a picture as possible of past events and environments.

The purpose of historical research is to verify and explain history of any area of human activities, subjects or events by means of scientific process. The most time honoured justification for doing historical research is that people can learn from the past (Spilackova, 2012). Shafer (1974) posits that, "In historical research, the investigator studies documents and other sources that contain facts concerning the research theme with the objective of achieving better understanding of present policies, practices, problems and institutions". An attempt is made to examine past events or combinations of events and establish facts in order to arrive at conclusions concerning past events or predict future events.

Considering that this work will largely lean on the secondary sources, it is proper to point out that the main sources of the secondary sources include textbooks, journals, magazines, Internet, government publications, newspaper articles, biographies, scholarly articles, court records, encyclopedias, materials culled from the Internet and other relevant materials.

Content analysis was used to analyze the secondary data gathered and used in this study. Content analysis involves a process designed to condense raw data into categories or themes based on valid inference and interpretation. This process uses inductive reasoning, by which themes and categories emerge from the data through the researcher's careful examination of the phenomena under study. It however does not need to exclude deductive reasoning (Patton, 2002).

IV. Conflicts and Regional Underdevelopment: A Review of Lake Chad Basin Region

Several scholars have done works on Nigeria foreign policy and the counter-insurgency in Chad Basin region since the phenomenon is not a new trend. Historically put, insurgents have operated in the Lake Chad Basin and across the wider Sahel region since the early 19th century, when 'warrior-scholars' led by Usman Dan Fodio used guerilla warfare to assert Fulani supremacy over the Hausa of present-day Nigeria (Comolli, 2015). In the 21st century, a handful of groups including Tanzīm al-Qā'idahfīBilād al-Maghrib al-Islāmī, otherwise known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama'atu Ahlissunnahlidda'awatiwal Jihad, or Boko Haram, Jama'atu AnsarulMusilimina Fi Biladis Sudan, or Ansaru, Ansar Dine, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa have emerged and ratcheted up their operations in the Chad Basin region unabatedly.

In the Lake Chad Basin, insurgencies are not new. Maitatsine, possibly the most well cited religiously-motivated insurgency in Nigeria prior to the formation of Boko Haram, had a large following already by 1972 and had amassed over 10,000 followers shortly thereafter (Adimbola, 2011). The group's founder and leader, Marwa Maitatsine, as his name signals, hailed from Maroua, Cameroon. Decades later, part of Maitatsine's doctrine - which asserted that karatunboko (Western education) was haram (forbidden) - has been echoed by Boko Haram as a core tenet (Comolli, 2015). Although painted as a Nigerian problem, Boko Haram, like Maiatsine, has also

drawn upon the deep and expansive political, social, cultural and economic ties that bridge the Lake Chad Basin.

However, the nefarious acts of Boko Haram have brought the concern about insurgency in the Chad Basin region to a high level that raises concern. Insurgency activities have largely spiraled in the Chad Basin region by the activities of Boko Haram and other numerous attacks have been carried out by Boko Haram since it became fully radicalized in 2009. Until 2010, attacks by Boko Haram have been minimal in scale. Large-scale attacks by the groups became more frequent, following the Bauchi prison breaks that led to the release of 700 inmates and an attack on a mosque in Maiduguri (Sahara Reporters, 2010).

The bombing of the United Nations (UN) Building in Abuja on August 27, 2011 was historic. The attack which resulted in the death of 23 people created international concern particularly, giving the global significance of the edifice involved. This attack was not considered as an attack on Nigeria alone but it was also seen as an attack on the global community (BBC News, 2011). The group's terror campaign and insurgency escalated since then. Attacks on government officials, religious leaders, police officers and students intensified in parts of northern and central Nigeria.

In April 2014, Boko Haram carried out the abduction of 276 school girls from the Government Secondary School in Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria (Human Right Watch, 2014). On February 19, 2018, at 5:30pm, one hundred and ten (110) schoolgirls aged 11–19 years old were kidnapped by the Boko Haram terrorist group from the Government Girls Science and Technical College (GGSTC), Dapchi, located in Bulabulin, Yunusari Local Government Area of Yobe State, in the northeast part of Nigeria (*Sahara Reporters, 2 March 2018*). These attacks attracted sustained international attention to Boko Haram and sparked a global campaign for their release (Clement, 2014).

According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) network, Boko Haram attacked two Cameroonian villages: Maki and Mada in the Tourou district in the north which resulted in the death of a significant number of people and the kidnapping of many children between the ages of 10-15 (BBC News, 2015). The Chad Republic had two of its police stations in N'Djamena bombed by Boko Haram, on June 15, 2015 and 38 people were killed. The main market of N'Djamena was also bombed on July 11, 2015 by a suicide bomber, resulting in the death of 15, with many injured (Reuters, 2015).

The resilience which Boko Haram exhibited since 2009 suggested that the Nigerian military lacked adequate capacity to dislodge Boko Haram. An ad hoc military coalition comprising troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon was constituted by President Goodluck Jonathan's administration to fight the Boko Haram (Lewis, 2015). No significant progress was recorded before Jonathan's tenure ended and President Muhammadu Buhari assumed office in May 2015.

President Buhari's first action, at his rise to office, was to relocate the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to N'Djamena. The MNJTF is a collaborative initiative of the Defence and Military Chiefs drawn from Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin in 1998 (Global Security, org, 2016). With its headquarters at Baga, Borno State in Nigeria, the MNJTF has the mandate to fight trans-border crimes in the Lake Chad region (Ugwu, 2015).

Since the beginning of Muhammadu Buhari's Presidency in 2015, the spate of frontal attacks by Boko Haram has dropped significantly but that has not translated into a reduction in Boko Haram induced fatality rate. Local and international media reports reveal that the number of attacks by Boko Haram increased from 127 in 2016 to 150 in 2017, in the same locations (BBC News, 2018).

A number of such attacks took place outside the Nigerian borders. Specifically, of the number of attacks in 2016, 80 took place in Nigeria, 26 in Cameroon, 3 in Chad and 18 in Niger, while in 2017, 109 attacks were carried out in Nigeria, 32 in Cameroon, 2 in Chad and 7 in Niger (BBC News, 2018). The method of attacks in all the locations ranges from armed assault to suicide attacks, which is the most common type.

Notwithstanding the changing position and tactics, the Nigerian Government may not be correct in claiming that Boko Haram has been 'technically defeated', as it has done severally. Bloody raids and suicide bomb attacks by this Islamist militant group still continues intermittently. The capture of 110 schoolgirls from Government Girls Science and Technical College (GGSTC), Dapchi in Yobe State in North Eastern Nigeria on February 19, 2018 (Sahara Reporters, 2018; Aljazeera News, 2018) is a strong indication that Boko Haram is still much alive and active (BBC News, 2018).

In about one decade of its existence, Boko Haram has killed a large number of people and has also rendered many homeless. Well over two million people have been made homeless; and many properties and farmlands mainly in the remote parts of North Eastern Nigeria have also been destroyed (Information Nigeria, 2018).

In terms of countermeasures, attempt at containing Boko Haram has attracted national and international level responses, giving the trans-border or transnational nature of its activities. At the national level, the Nigerian government came up with the Terrorism (Prevention) Bill, 2011 as part of the efforts in tackling terrorist activities. This Bill, signed into law in 2012 was amended in 2013 to accommodate ways of dealing with other terrorism-related crimes (Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act, 2013). The Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2013 authorises death penalty for any individual guilty of terrorist acts. In giving effect to the central object of the Terrorism Prevention Act, 2013, the Goodluck Jonathan's administration gave unreserved powers to the State Security in the fight against Boko Haram.

As part of the anti-Boko Haram measure, the Federal Government also declared state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, Plateau and Niger States in December 2011; Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States in May 2013, and a military shut down of mobile telephone network in the three North-Eastern states, which disrupted the free flow of communication within the group (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). Whereas these measures destabilised the group's effectiveness for a short period, it provoked negative reactions from the people of the region, due to the negative socio-economic impact it had on their lives (Jacob and Akpan, 2015).

Furthermore, Nigeria also collaborated with the United Kingdom on counter-insurgency measures (Premium Times, 2013). France's assistance was also requested in the fight against the group, following the Yobe State school attack on February 25, 2014 (Institute for Security Studies, 2014). The Nigerian government also acknowledged the dispatch of a US team to aid the recovery of the abducted schoolgirls by Boko Haram in May 2014. The United States, France and China also had their teams on the ground in Nigeria to assist with these efforts.

At the regional level, countries such as the Republic of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, on March 5, 2014, signed an agreement with Nigeria on a massive joint offensive against Boko Haram (Festus, 2014). The aim of the agreement is to improve the coordination of security, effective border policing and exchange of intelligence among states within the West African sub-region. Following the signing of the multinational agreement was a meeting of the Ministers of Defence from the six countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). The meeting which took place in Yaounde ended in the signing of the agreement on the establishment a multinational force to

strengthen security in the region (The Lake Chad Basin Commission, 2014). Due to the efforts of Nigeria as a major stakeholder, she has inspired groupings such as the AU, ECOWAS, EU, UN Security Council etc to assist in curbing the insurgency menace in the Chad Basin region.

The Boko Haram insurgency has also attracted responses from the wider international community. These encompass efforts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UNSC. It is believed by the ICC that the Nigerian military and the extremist Boko Haram have committed possible crimes against humanity and war crimes in the past years of insurgencies in the North East region (Nicholas, 2015). According to the ICC's Preliminary Examination Report on Nigeria, the Prosecutor's office finds the Nigeria Military and the Boko Haram wanting on eight identified possible cases of crimes against humanity and war crimes under Article 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute (The Lake Chad Basin Commission, 2014).

The Yusufiyah movement - the precursor to Boko Haram which originated and grew in northeast Nigeria from 1998-1999 - rapidly expanded into other parts of the Lake Chad region. While this has partly to do with the region's kinship networks and porous borders, the narrative of oppression in the most marginalized areas of the four countries of the Lake Chad region also resonated with followers. When the conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government broke out in 2009, many of the former students of Muhammad Yusuf, the movement's founder, fled from Nigeria to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, where they benefited from the patronage of relatives and local followers. For years, these insurgents used northern Cameroon and southern Niger as a safe haven as well as a logistics hub and rear-base area, where they were able to obtain supplies, stockpile weapons and establish mechanisms to support the insurgency (Nusrullah, 2015).

Similar to Ansaru, Boko Haram and its affiliates also began to recruit fighters - including women - from Cameroon and southern Niger (Zenn and Pearson, 2014). The group has so far gathered its strongest support among disaffected youth. In Cameroon, since at least as early as 2011, around 4,000 Cameroonian nationals are suspected to have joined Boko Haram in various roles including as fighters, spiritual guides and logisticians. The number of sympathizers is even higher (Connor, 2017). In Niger, Yusufiyah surrogates who returned to the Diffa region from Maiduguri in neighboring Nigeria in the early 2000s, have recruited Nigerian youth into Boko Haram (Connor, 2017). While the massacre at Baga, on the Chad-Nigeria border with Chad in January 2015 drew international attention to Boko Haram's trans-boundary capabilities, limited focus is paid to the devastation that has been wrought outside Nigeria. Cameroon alone has experienced close to 500 Boko Haram attacks and 50 fatal suicide bombings (Connor, 2017).

Aside from Abuja, governments in the region initially tried to turn a blind eye to the insurgency faced in their countries, preferring instead to use surveillance to monitor what they believed to be a Nigerian jihadist problem. The situation changed in 2014, when Cameroon started to arrest and sentence Boko Haram insurgents. The Cameroonian military bolstered its forces in its northernmost region, including deploying its Rapid Reaction Brigade (BIR). In 2015, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was formed between Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, and Niger (with Benin also joining) to pool security resources in the fight against Boko Haram.

While other Chad Basin governments may have been initially cagey about the extent to which Boko Haram operates outside of Nigeria, their militaries have recently spent a great amount of time cleaning up their backyards of the insurgency. Yet the effect has been limited as insurgents - pushed across border - re-group. Despite several previous years of such pushback, in 2015, fatal Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger increased by 157% (Global Terrorism Index, 2016). Despite the magnitude of the insurgency and its formidable and sophisticated security

features, local actors have continued to espouse an Islamist religious narrative to describe the violence (Connor, 2017). A risk remains that regional forces could buckle under the pressure of an increased scale of insurgency similar to the dramatic attack in Bosso, Niger against the military in June 2016. Recent strings of multiple, fatal suicide bombings across the region demonstrate Boko Haram's resilience and the on-going need for increased cooperation among the Lake Chad countries to address these concerns.

V. Findings

Given what has been discussed in this paper, some findings have become very obvious. One is that Boko Haram has fueled instability across the Chad Basin region. It has displaced millions and put them at risk of starvation, jeopardized education and health services, stalled humanitarian aid efforts, and undercut government authority in Nigeria and abroad. Secondly, the insurgency has scared off international investors, particularly in Nigeria, where it adds to a list of threats that includes other militant groups, which target oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta, and sectarian conflict in the country's Middle Belt. Foreign direct investment inflows to the country have plummeted since 2011, falling from a high of almost \$9 billion to \$3.5 billion in 2017 (Johnson & Sergie, 2018). Recent attacks and abductions signal that, despite being pushed into remote areas, Boko Haram will likely continue to disrupt the region's development for some time. Boko Haram represents an ugly paradox. Its ideas have limited appeal but significant staying power. The group can be crushed militarily, yet state violence fuels its narrative of victimhood. The insurgency in the Chad Basin region has heightened and placed the structural vulnerability of the area, with its soaring demographic growth tensions in a situation of massive poverty, political fragility, and climate change that call for immediate concerted solutions.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has explored Nigeria's foreign policy in the light of counter-insurgency in Chad Basin region. This brings to the fore the security implications of the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria and in the West African sub-region. It draws on the linkage theory as an explanatory paradigm to examine the group's uprisings on the wider sub-regional security implications. The study finds that the resilient and intractable nature of Boko Haram derives from the internal and external linkages and material supports the group has been exposed. Insurgency by Boko Haram, this paper argues, will continue to pose a threat to sub-regional security in the Chad Basin region as long as it retains the capacity to withstand and defy military containment. Therefore, a more actionable step to take would be for the government of Nigeria to go beyond the confines of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to solicit the cooperation of all countries in the West African sub-region to confront insurgency, and particularly Boko Haram, as a common enemy.

Consequently, this paper makes the following recommendations:

1. The five-member state Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) should be empowered with the required human and material resources to manage the insurgency. The countries - Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Benin and Nigeria - which constitute the MNJTF should demonstrate the political will to keep to the rules of engagement on the MNJTF agreement, as that would be crucial to the success of the task force. The MNJTF should also be sustained to prevent Boko Haram from regenerating itself.
2. The government of Nigeria and that of the MNJTF countries should pay more attention to the global and regional tide of terrorism and identify their connections to local extremism. This will

enable governments to detect early warning signs and take precautionary measures against any possible uprising.

3. Steps should be taken by the government to use the appropriate faith-based organizations to constantly readdress the ideological and religious perversions which Boko Haram has created, to redirect the perverted back to the genuine religious teachings. This will reduce the surge of radicalization in the society.
4. There is the need for the development and implementation of a holistic and coherent strategy that responds to the manifestations and the drivers of the insurgency in and around the Lake Chad Basin by addressing crime, justice, good governance and local and regional economic development.
5. Stakeholder states in the Chad Basin region should be made to realise that it is proper for them to have sustained political will and national commitment to deal with the crisis domestically at country-level.
6. There should be put in place bolstered civil-military cooperation that effectively counters ever-shifting tactics as well as recruitment into violent activities.
7. Stakeholders should encourage enhanced military cooperation across borders to understand and combat the various insurgency groups and criminality in the Chad Basin region.

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